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Military Affairs

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Yazov Article Views Defense Building

PM0808172988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
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[Article by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister: "The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building"—boldface as published]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Plenum held on 29 July of this year translated into concrete practical measures the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which was a most important political milestone in the restructuring and revolutionary renewal of all spheres of our society's life. Restructuring is also deepening in defense building, of which the building of the Armed Forces is an integral part. The effectiveness of this building, the all-union party conference noted, should be ensured primarily by means of qualitative parameters. This fundamental political principle defines the content and thrust of the work of command and political cadres, party organizations, and all personnel of the Army and Navy in ensuring a level of training and combat readiness of the Armed Forces that meets the demands of the time.

I.

The conclusion drawn by the 19th all-union party conference on the need to ensure the effectiveness of defense building primarily by means of qualitative parameters is innovative in nature. It is based on profound scientific analysis, study of the essence of present-day phenomena, and interpretation of the processes taking place in world development, and at the same time rests on the firm foundations of more than 70 years of experience and the traditions of the CPSU's Leninist policy in the sphere of defense and the country's security.

This policy has always been and remains open, honest, and consistent. Its essence, from the moment of the Soviet state's emergence to this day, is determined by the nature of socialism—a system that is oriented toward peaceful coexistence with states of different social systems and firmly, unconditionally rejects war as a means of resolving interstate political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes.

As for the wars that we have waged, they were imposed on us from outside by imperialist reaction. They were wars in defense of the socialist fatherland. And the victories secured by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in these just—on our side—wars of liberation were a natural phenomenon. They were in accordance with the vital, crucial interests of all peoples because they heralded the defeat of the forces of aggression and militarism, restricted their potential for unleashing new wars, and strengthened the hope of man's final deliverance from them. Both in their sociopolitical nature and in their worldwide historical significance, they were victories for the sake of progress, for the sake of peace.

Soviet people's commitment to peace is organic and unshakable. Our plans for the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development and the revolutionary restructuring and renewal of society are pinned on peace. It is entirely natural that, while engaging in peaceful, creative labor, our country, like any other, attaches great significance to the inviolability of its borders and to safeguarding the people's peaceful labor. We cherish our motherland, our land, our way of life, our freedom and independence, we cherish everything created by generations of Soviet people. One of our society's moral standpoints that cannot be exchanged and that nurture its insuperable spiritual strength is that the defense of the socialist fatherland, both according to the Constitution and according to its own essential meaning, is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR and the cause of all the Soviet people.

At the present stage of our society's development, Soviet defense building takes place in strict accordance with the concept of the new political thinking put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress, which defines our party's present policy. This has its concrete, practical embodiment in **the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine.**

One of the main elements of our military doctrine is the principle of defense sufficiency. Its implementation presupposes a steady fall in the levels of military confrontation along with the observance of reciprocity, equality, and identical security of the sides.

It is well known that it is not we who set the limits of these levels. We are ready for them to be radically lowered, for constructive talks on any questions of the reduction of armed forces and armaments, for a joint quest for solutions to the existing imbalances and asymmetries, for the discussion of the necessary verification measures. This is confirmed convincingly by our country's position at the four meetings between the USSR and U.S. leaders, in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, and in the course of the current talks on strengthening peace and cooperation and establishing an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and trust in Europe and throughout the world.

Life shows that as a result of the efforts of the socialist countries and the broad international public and as a consequence of the realism shown by various states and political circles, the new thinking and the associated positive processes are forging a path in the world arena. But the guarantees of the irreversibility of these processes have yet to take shape; there has not been a radical change for the better. The situation in the world remains complex and contradictory. Imperialist sources of aggression and war continue to exist. A threat to peace from imperialist militarism also persists.

Unequivocal indications as to whom this threat is spearheaded against are provided by the NATO plans for "upgrading" and "compensation" and other militarist programs, and indeed by the whole course of military building in the NATO states, which is carried out in accordance with the principles of the essentially aggressive doctrines of "direct confrontation" and "flexible response."

Naturally, all this is duly assessed and taken into account by our party in the course of the elaboration of the strategy and tactics of defense building and the ways to ensure its effectiveness. The orientation first and foremost toward qualitative parameters is in strict accordance with our defensive military doctrine and wholly accords with the concrete conditions of the present stage of world development. It is dictated, first, by the need to make the positive trends in this development irreversible. Second, by the opportunities for opposing the policy of strength that are opened up by approaches based on the new political thinking in tackling the problems of strengthening international security and peace. And third, by the fact that the emphasis on quantitative indicators is becoming not only increasingly costly, but less and less effective in both military-political terms and purely military terms.

Qualitative parameters with regard to each of the areas of defense building named by the all-union party conference—hardware, military science, the composition of the Armed Forces—have a very specific meaning. Their implementation should be endowed with an equally specific, businesslike, practical nature, in the spirit of the conference demands, which were confirmed with new force by the Central Committee July plenum.

II.

Reliance on qualitative indicators in defense building pursues the objective not of building up the combat might of the Armed Forces—and this must be emphasized quite definitely—but of maintaining this might at a level which precludes military superiority over us and guarantees the reliable protection of Soviet people's peaceful labor and peaceful life. The solution of this task on the basis of a qualitative approach is in line not only with the specific historical conditions of the contemporary stage of international development, as mentioned above, but also with the strategy of restructuring, the spirit and demands of the economic reform, the course of democratization, and the intensification of the role of the human factor.

The accent on quality in terms of **equipment** primarily means radically increasing its reliability and improving its combat specifications. This task is being resolved by our scientists, designers, engineers, technicians, and defense industry workers jointly with military specialists and servicemen from the Armed Forces. There are reserves here, frequently quite sizeable, which must be persistently brought into play. At the same time, it is

important to steadily raise the level of the personnel's combat proficiency and technological standards. Moreover, the main feature of this level of proficiency is the ability to intelligently operate and utilize the weapons and combat equipment, and ultimately to obtain from them everything that they are designed to provide, to utilize them most efficiently in any circumstances and conditions, and to attain the best possible results.

The collective nature of modern weapons and combat equipment and the conditions of their application make rigorous demands not only of a serviceman's individual skills but also of the combat coordination of subunits, units, and ships and presuppose a high degree of interchangeability in combat details and crews. The increase in the role of the time factor dictates the need to master weapons and the methods for utilizing them as swiftly as possible and to constantly improve the fulfillment of combat norms. Another aspect of the matter, most directly related to quality indicators, must also be mentioned. In order to become a genuine master of a combat speciality it is necessary to love the weapons, be proud of them, and firmly believe in their reliability and might. The experience of the Great Patriotic War, the combat practice of the limited contingent of our troops in Afghanistan, and everyday combat training and service in the Army and Navy show that this is what makes a proper servicemen in the real sense of the word; this is what makes a real officer and soldier.

In terms of **military science** the main quality indicators are linked first and foremost with the accelerated development of its priority avenues, and primarily with the elaboration of new concepts of military art in accordance with the defensive nature of our military doctrine and the search for an effective solution to the problems of the improvement of the system for training military cadres and increasing the effectiveness of the political, military, moral, and legal education of the personnel.

A direct contribution to quality is made by the optimization of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces' scientific establishments, the improvement of the leadership of scientific work, the raising of the level of equipment available for it, the improvement of the material base in general, the narrowing of the gap between military-theoretical and military-technical research, a decisive improvement in the fruitfulness of this research, and a reduction in the time taken to introduce theoretical conclusions, scientific recommendations, and technical innovations into practice.

It was stressed at the CPSU Central Committee July plenum that without active assistance from science we will not cope with the tasks of restructuring. This also applies in full to restructuring in the Armed Forces. The universally known demand for an indissoluble interconnection between theory and practice is twice and three times as valid for military science. Its main laboratories are the field, the air, the sea, and everyday Army and Navy practice. And it can move forward, improve in

qualitative terms, and benefit the building of the Armed Forces in tangible, concrete terms only on the basis of joint efforts by scientists, the collectives of military training and scientific research establishments, and commanders, political workers, specialist officers, and all our military cadres.

To this day our military thought is often still fettered by passivity, stereotyped thinking, and a lack of competition between ideas and opinions. It is difficult to count on a high return from it unless obsolete approaches, methods, and stereotypes are abandoned and the entire situation in military science is democratized. Creativity, initiative, bold questing, reasonable risk—these represent oxygen for real science and it is only as a result of them that its creative potential can be fully disclosed.

The qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces from the viewpoint of their **composition** presupposes first and foremost the creation of an organizational structure for staffs and troops which ensures that they are in keeping with their objectives, match their purpose to the maximum extent, translate their existing combat potential into reality most fully, and unconditionally fulfill their prescribed tasks for the minimum expenditure of funds and resources. Here the development of the branches and categories of troops must be not only balanced to the highest degree but must also take into account the practical steps currently being implemented along the path of disarmament and the prospects for disarmament and fully match the demands of the defensive doctrine.

Improvements in the system of control and its efficiency lead to improvements in the qualitative characteristics of the Armed Forces. This work is being carried out in two directions. The first includes the improvement of training and combat coordination among control bodies, and the second involves the extensive automation of this control. It is perfectly obvious that only interconnected progress in both of these directions can ensure a real increase in the quality of control. It is equally obvious that the criteria of quality must be not the number of orders, directives, instructions, or other documents prepared by given bodies or the number of visits made or checks and inspections carried out but the extent of the actual impact made on improving matters in the formations, units, or ships under your jurisdiction and on increasing the practical results achieved in combat readiness, troop training, and military discipline.

The introduction of quality parameters with respect to Armed Forces personnel presupposes a rise in the standard of the operational and combat training of troops and naval forces and the utmost intensification of this training. Highly organized and distinguished by being of a modern methodological standard, integrated, economical, and yielding the maximum useful return from every hour and every minute spent under instruction, this training must constitute in practice the main content of the life and activity of staffs and troops. In addition to

improving combat training norms and implementing measures to regularize the training and educational process, the operating mechanism for improving quality here involves the uncompromising eradication of pomp and show, lack of preciseness, and oversimplification, "automatic reaction training" of personnel, and the process of diverting them from training to other things.

For all the importance of other factors in the qualitative improvement of Armed Forces personnel, a special role in resolving this task belongs to the strengthening of troop discipline. Deviations from its demands and norms and manifestations of lack of diligence, irresponsibility, and negligence or dereliction of duty inevitably have a negative impact on the combat readiness and combat capability of a subdivision, unit, or ship. Strong and conscious troop discipline is simultaneously a condition, a means, and a guarantee of restructuring and the renewal of military life. It forms part of the basis of regulation order, which ensures the consistent implementation of the principle of one-man command, the precise functioning of the entire troop organism, and the creation of a healthy moral and psychological atmosphere in the collective.

Regulation order guarantees the implementation of the rights and freedoms granted to a serviceman as a Soviet citizen in unity with the obligations of military service imposed on him, respect for the dignity of the individual, and attention to his interests, requirements, and needs. Favorable conditions are thereby opened up for the personnel's creative potential to be revealed and to be widely utilized for improving the qualitative indicators of combat training and service.

Ultimately the everyday practical work of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and all Armed Forces personnel to implement the directives of the 19th all-union party conference in the sphere of defense building is subordinated to ensuring a level of combat readiness of troops and naval forces which would guarantee the reliable defense of the motherland, socialism, and peace however the international situation develops and whatever reductions of troops and armaments and other organizational and technical measures are carried out. The further broadening of the restructuring front and the deepening of the process of democratization in the Armed Forces promote the successful fulfillment of this task.

III.

The process of democratization is **inevitable** for our Armed Forces as a section of the people, for whom the revolutionary restructuring of society has become a vital cause. It is aimed at restoring and deepening the norms and principles of military life and activity stemming from the socialist nature of our Armed Forces and based on social justice and respect for the individual. Democratization presupposes the affirmation of the equal responsibility of all servicemen before the law and the

demands of the oath and the regulations regarding the discharge of military duty and official obligations. As far as command and political cadres are concerned, this is also a political and moral responsibility to their subordinates for the quality of management and the general course and state of affairs in subunits and units and on ships. This most important facet of democratization must not be forgotten.

At the same time, the process of democratization is **natural** for the Soviet Armed Forces because the democratic spirit is fundamentally inherent in our military organization born of the socialist social and state system. It is embodied in the social and national composition of the officer corps, which is identical to the composition of drafted servicemen, and in the principles of Army and Navy staffing, training, and education. Our general military regulations and the demands of military discipline, which, according to Lenin, is socialist, conscious, and comradely, are imbued with a spirit of democracy.

There is a close dialectical dependence between the democratization of military life and the qualitative state of the Armed Forces. By involving the mass of military servicemen in the active, interested, and responsible solution of the tasks facing military collectives, democratization promotes the fuller utilization of the intellectual and spiritual potential of all the democratic institutions in the Army and the Navy. It creates the preconditions for ensuring that the **human factor** really begins to operate actively, without which the parameters of quality with regard to hardware, military science, and the composition of the Armed Forces cannot be achieved. It is only through people's activity, initiative and creativity, conscientious labor, and cohesion and selflessness that the Army and the Navy can be raised to a qualitatively new level of combat readiness, combat training, and discipline.

There is no alternative to democratization for achieving the final destruction of the braking mechanisms which still persist in the Armed Forces. These include the formal and bureaucratic methods which are still current among some military cadres. They include the inertia of wage-leveling, consumerism, freeloading, and the related social apathy and psychology of "favoritism" among some servicemen. They include, as before, the acute lack of individual work with people.

The key to eliminating the braking mechanisms was given in the resolutions of the 19th all-union party conference and the specific paths, forms, and methods for solving this task were provided by the July CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The struggle to improve qualitative indicators means first and foremost the struggle against **bureaucracy**. But not a "general" struggle—a nonspecific, depersonalized one. Such a struggle will hardly produce a result. Bureaucracy is a concrete phenomenon, and the carriers of it in the Army and the Navy are also quite concrete. It has

infected those military leaders of various ranks and titles who display high-handedness and arrogance, disregard for the interests of subordinates, callousness, the use of red tape, and a desire to shift responsibility onto others. The distinguishing features of the bureaucrat are the habit of waiting for instructions on any matter, of looking to the "leadership," and of trying to anticipate and fall in line with its opinion and the attempt to avoid the solution of concrete questions and tasks and to shirk real work by means of futile paperwork. As a rule the bureaucrat attributes his own shortcomings, omissions, and failings in work to others, often to his subordinates, for the results of whose work he is personally responsible. It is very important to see all this, to evaluate it uncompromisingly and eradicate it most resolutely from Army and Navy life.

During the restructuring of military life commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organs are being increasingly resolutely turned toward questions of **national relations** in Army and Navy collectives. The 19th all-union party conference stressed that service in the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy must be a real schooling in internationalism. The task is a responsible one and demands a knowledge of the culture and traditions of the peoples of our motherland, thoughtfulness, an equal and even-handed attitude toward servicemen of different nationalities, identical exactingness toward and concern for them, and the cohesion of personnel on the principles of friendship and fraternity. The fulfillment of this task is among the most important conditions for ensuring the Armed Forces' building by means of qualitative indicators.

Glasnost is an effective weapon of restructuring, democratization, and the exposure and utilization of reserves for improving the qualitative state of the Armed Forces. The atmosphere of glasnost helps to develop in servicemen an active life stance, to mobilize the organizing and educational potential of public opinion, and to assert in military collectives an atmosphere of high political activeness and intolerance of all phenomena of stagnation, instances of unconscientiousness, carelessness, and nonregulation of mutual relations. The most vulnerable point in this question at present is the passivity of junior commanders, soldiers, and sailors in the struggle against shortcomings and for restructuring. The most important task of democratization and of all restructuring in the Army and the Navy is to inspire them, to help them believe in the strength of Army and Navy people and collectivism, and to arouse them to become consciously and actively involved in this struggle.

Glasnost presupposes the possibility of a free and open exchange of opinions. Pluralism of opinions in no way runs counter to military order. What is more, the need to listen to the opinion of subordinates and the collective and to consider this opinion in our work is envisaged by our general military and combat regulations. Quite naturally, they do not allow criticism and discussion of orders; however, at the same time, in no way do they

identify the right to make decisions and give orders with rigid, static thinking. The Leninist principle of which we were reminded by the all-union conference must come into play here: There must be free discussion of all problems and unity of action after the adoption of decisions. It should be emphasized that glasnost presupposes businesslike criticism and has absolutely nothing in common with empty carping or attempts to replace democracy with demagoguery.

Effective **legal education** for personnel is of great significance for the aware, responsible, and therefore good-quality fulfillment of military service duties by servicemen, for their observance of the order and regulations established in the Army and Navy, and, at the same time, for the display of initiative and creativity within the limits of the rights granted to them. This education must be firmly linked to real life and to Army and Navy practice and be implemented within the framework of the general legal education which the all-union party conference decided to organize.

In the Armed Forces, as in our society as a whole, the process of restructuring and democratization was begun by the party and is developing under its leadership. Being the conduits of CPSU policy in the Army and the Navy, command and political cadres are called upon to organize this process and channel it in the direction of qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces. The ability to head this process and ensure that it develops and grows deeper is now a most important indicator of the political, professional, and moral maturity of commanders, political workers, and all officers.

Solving the tasks of the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces makes special demands on cadres' competence and their ability to act in conditions of democratization and glasnost and to find new, nonstandard approaches to the problems of military life—from combat readiness to sociocultural conditions. Something that is of fundamental significance is the revival of spiritual closeness to subordinates, which some officers have lost. The ability of commanders and political workers to use their authority to the full in the interests of the cause and take responsibility upon themselves has been filled with new meaning. Everyday practice shows that success attends those officers who act independently, creatively, and with initiative, relying on the party and Komsomol organization and the military collective, and using the role and influence of officers' meetings, permanent certification commissions, personnel meetings, comrades' courts of honor, women's councils, and other democratic institutions.

The experience we have accumulated in restructuring clearly shows that party organizations are its generator and the accelerator of the democratization process in the Army and Navy. The realization of the potential existing in a subunit, unit, or ship to improve qualitative indicators in training, service, discipline, and combat readiness directly depends on their militancy, on their activeness

in internal party life, and on ensuring that Communists set a personal example and play a vanguard role. Party leadership of the Army and Navy Komsomol requires a new quality. As stated at the conference, a fundamental task is to bring everything within the framework of practical work and not permit excessive tutelage and organization. It is important to channel the creative potential of Komsomol organizations into developing in young servicemen correct notions of honor, dignity, comradeship, and friendship, cultivating patriotism and internationalism, and establishing the high prestige of conscientious military work and an unshakable loyalty to military duty.

All ideological and political education work must be geared to this. It must be organized in such a way as to ensure that the individual is the constant focus of attention and that, as noted at the July CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the ideas of restructuring gain an increasingly broad hold on the masses and theory really becomes a material force of restructuring.

The time demands that command and political cadres and party and Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy work vigorously to give restructuring greater dynamism and effectiveness and face them with the need to put an end to shillyshallying and deal a final blow to everything impeding our progress. It is precisely this kind of work—imbued with a sense of great responsibility for the fate of restructuring and for reliably ensuring our country's security and our people's peaceful labor—that is called upon to raise our Armed Forces to a qualitatively new level.

Vice Admiral Interviewed on Navy Day

LD3107163088 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Interview with Vice Admiral Vasily Ivanovich Panin, chief of the Navy political directorate, by Galina Vinogradova on the occasion of the USSR Navy Day, in the studio; date not given—recorded from the "Time, Events and People" program]

[Text] [Vinogradova] Vasily Ivanovich, as far as I know, you have already devoted 36 years of your life to service in the Navy.

[Panin] Yes, that is so, Galina Yefimovna.

[Vinogradova] That indeed is a whole person's life. You know, today I want to convey through you my congratulations to the entire personnel of this branch of the Armed Forces on Navy Day.

[Panin] Thank you very much. I am sincerely grateful to you.

[Vinogradova] Vasily Ivanovich, as far as I know, it was back before the war, I think, that this Navy Day festival was first celebrated.

[Panin] Yes, we have been celebrating Navy Day since 1939, and we are now marking it for the 49th time.

[Vinogradova] Exactly a year ago you were a guest of our "Time, Events and People" program, and it would be very interesting for you to say what has changed in the Navy during the year.

[Panin] There have certainly been changes. First and foremost people have changed. I will not be wrong to say that there has been a sharp upsurge in the civil self-awareness of personnel. As never before there is evidence of a lively involvement in the affairs and life of the people. The ideas of restructuring, the preparations for the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, and of course the conference itself have left no one outside sociopolitical life. Frankness of opinion, glasnost, principled stands, and critical judgment have all become natural in the life of each collective of servicemen. In this we see, above all, a qualitative growth in the Navy's decisive strength, which is people. This is certainly a guarantee of the fulfillment of our future practical work.

[Vinogradova] Tell me, is it possible in this connection to speak about any specific results and outcomes?

[Panin] Yes, of course. After all, Navy Day is not only a professional festival for the Navy's sailors. It is also to a certain extent a demarcation line in combat and political training. If one is to speak of the results of the first half-year, we have in all fleets and throughout the Navy as a whole a growth in qualitative performance indicators in all forms of combat and political training. People's conduct has also become more responsible. We think that there is now more organization and order in collectives of servicemen, with the caveat that in this respect there is room for improvement—much room...

First and foremost today I want to mention the crews of the Soviet ships which are performing responsible tasks in all respects in the difficult Persian Gulf. A high standard of naval training has been displayed by the crews of the naval minesweepers Zaryad and Kurskiy Komsomolets, the destroyers Stoykiy and Boyevoy, the large antisubmarine ship Admiral Tributs, and other ships.

The personnel of the nuclear submarine Minskiy Komsomolets, the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy, have carried out their tasks on a long voyage with a high assessment. A good reputation has been gained this year by the crews of the aircraft carrier cruisers Novorossiysk and Minsk, and there has been much good work aboard the rocket cruiser Varyag and Groznyy and the large antisubmarine ship Ochakov. All of these are among many other collectives of servicemen who have successfully fulfilled their first period of training and are rightfully the pacesetters in our Navy.

[Vinogradova] Vasily Ivanovich, I know that you were a delegate to the 19th all-union party conference. Some comrades feel that insufficient attention was paid to the defense issue.

[Panin] No, this is not my view. First, although there was a tremendous wish by many delegates to have their say at the conference, the floor was nevertheless given to Lieutenant General Gromov, Army commander and the Armed Forces' delegate. Second, one must bear in mind that the country's defense and the power of the Soviet Armed Forces is a product of the economy, scientific potential, and the people's moral and political condition, and these matters, as you know, were paid exceptional attention at the conference. It seems to me and to military people that the task for the Armed Forces is well understood and was expressed clearly by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Its essence boils down to this: defense effectiveness should henceforth be ensured predominantly by qualitative parameters both with regard to equipment and military science and with regard to the personnel of the Armed Forces. If one bears this all in mind, I think you will agree that sufficient attention was paid to the defense issue at the conference.

[Vinogradova] How then were the decisions of the conference received by the personnel of the Navy? I would like to hear your personal observations in this respect.

[Panin] You know, of late I have been having very frequent encounters with the personnel of many collectives of servicemen as a delegate of the 19th conference. I can say quite definitely that study of the material and decisions of the party conference has not only evoked lively interest but also profound pondering on the part of the servicemen about ways to implement them. In one servicemen's collective in the northern fleet, for instance, along with proposals, I was asked 71 questions. I was answering the questions for over 3 hours. Each resolution and each provision of the 19th all-union party conference is now being pondered. Its decisions are becoming part of our life. This was discussed at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which has just taken place.

[Vinogradova] Incidentally, don't the notions of glasnost and democratization come into conflict with strictly regulated military service?

[Panin] No, they do not. Unified command on a party basis has been, is, and remains the main principle in the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces. Incidentally, it has always depended on the party collective and collective common sense as a whole. Glasnost and democratization, I think, help us to avoid mistakes and to consider and adopt decisions while taking account of their moral-political consequences for servicemen's collectives and for all personnel. This particularly applies to the social sphere of our existence and life. As far as combat control is concerned, this must certainly continue to be implemented firmly and without deviation.

[Vinogradova] That is to say that, as throughout our entire life, glasnost and democratization must be combined with strict discipline.

[Panin] Yes, that is definitely so.

[Vinogradova] Vasilii Ivanovich, today is your festival, and perhaps it is not so necessary to speak about shortcomings.

[Panin] Why should that be? It is necessary to speak of shortcomings, too.

[Vinogradova] Okay, then, here is a question for you: Surely problems, difficulties, and unresolved issues exist in the Navy, as they do throughout our life?

[Panin] Of course they do. In combat training, for instance, the main mechanism holding us back is infringements on the systematic character of combat training, personnel being taken away from their studies, and oversimplification of training. The main principle of teaching troops what is essential in war is being violated all around.

Restructuring is bringing about the attainment of a new level in the moral and political condition among personnel and the strengthening of discipline. Here, efforts are being directed at finally eradicating nonregulation relationships and at firmly establishing standards of communal life in servicemen's collectives. In short, the main aim is to bring the whole of the life and activities of the Navy strictly into line with the requirements of the party and the times we are now living through.

[Vinogradova] You know, in before and after the war, probably one out of two young boys wanted to serve in the Navy. Now among a certain section of young people there is a widespread view that service in the Navy is harder and longer than in other branches of the forces. After all, the term of service lasts for 3 years in the Navy, does it not?

[Panin] Yes, that is so. I do not think, however, that there is any easy service in the Forces, either in the Navy or in the other branches of the Armed Forces, but if one is speaking about hardships in naval service, it does indeed require the devotion of all one's moral and physical strength. The ships do make lengthy maritime and oceanic voyages in different climatic conditions. There is the pitching and rolling. There is the separation from one's homeland. All this certainly demands both extraordinary capabilities and tremendous willpower. Service in the Navy is definitely for real men. As for the 3-year term of service, this term is, in my view, the minimum possible for a person to become a real sailor. I always remember what the famous Russian naval commander, Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov, had to say. There is no hard or easy path for a sailor, he used to say.

There is just one path: that of glory. Indeed, it is not without pride that I say that the overwhelming majority of personnel proceed precisely along such a path.

To round off our conversation, I will permit myself on behalf of the Military Council and the political director of the Navy to cordially congratulate the personnel of ships and units and above all those that are currently performing an ocean tour of duty far from home shores, and to congratulate their relatives and friends, our glorious veterans, our wonderful designers and shipbuilders, college cadets and pupils belonging to the Young Sailors' Club on Navy Day, and to wish everyone good health, great happiness, and success in their service and work.

Response to Critics of 'Dedovshchina'

18010425c Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian 15 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by V. Grevtsev: "Things to Think About and Act Upon"]

[Text] It is not an easy thing to become used to glasnost, to the absence of "forbidden zones." One of the prices of this process is the unique sort of euphoria produced by the freedom, the unusual lightness with which we sometimes extract global and categorical generalizations from isolated situations, and pass our "sentences" without troubling ourselves with their grounds.

On 25 May LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published the letter "A Heart Stops" about a sad occurrence: On learning that his son, a soldier, had been subjected to "dedovshchina," a war veteran had a heart attack and died tragically.

One feels for the anxiety and pain of the authors of the letter. But the one thing that is astounding is that their conclusions are so categorical: "...it is evident to all who do not wish to hide their eyes that mutual relations that disfigure the spirit of young people for the rest of their lives reign in the army."

So it is, no more, no less. Speaking in behalf of "all," they deliberately close the door to any other opinion. They take one single problem in the army and make it into the main law of its existence. And what comes out in the end is unproven, unpersuasive and, in the final analysis, simply lacking any seriousness.

This letter is akin to some responses to Yu. Fedorko's article "At Variance with the Truth," published in our newspaper on 2 March of this year. The author, if we recall, subjected Yu. Polyakov's story "A Hundred Days Before Orders," devoted to "dedovshchina," to critical analysis. That was his right. But apparently there are some who feel that this story is untouchable, and that it is subject to no criticism of any kind.

The newspaper received a letter signed by "Private I. Malinovsky" which contained only abuse, and not a single valid argument.

"This (Yu. Fedorko's article—V. G.) is but a cover for hypocrisy. The article is clearly a fabrication. V. Leychak, Yakutsk ASSR."

"I would advise you to be more discriminating in the articles you select, and if you don't know what to write about, get some advice from someone else. Yu. Boyev, Gomel Oblast."

I offer these responses (these "ravings" is what I would like to call them) without commentary. Let me just say that all of this—the angry labels, the allusions to unscrupulousness, the menacing demands to "conform"—are combined in the letters with protests against the pressure imposed by, of all things, glasnost.

"Polyakov's story is truthful down to the last word: it gives a true picture of life, and it is written in living, modern language." So writes Vladimir Nefedov from the Moscow area to the editor. Let the author of the story take pleasure in this characterization. I will note simply that the reader does not confirm his categorical conclusion with anything but a few more general phrases of this sort:

"Yu. Polyakov is telling the truth. 'Dedovshchina' does exist in the army," notes A. Andreyev, a teacher from Udmurt ASSR. But above all else, Yu. Fedorko never rejected the presence of unbecoming mutual relations in the armed forces (some readers accuse him of doing just that). On the contrary, he demonstrated the need for a persistent struggle against this evil—a struggle which is being waged actively today in the army. This struggle, wrote the article's author, "does not need 'assistance' in the form of speculations and incitement of passions." Yu. Fedorko feels that the story "A Hundred Days Before Orders" raises "dedovshchina" to the rank of an evil that is notoriously invincible, something which determines all of army life (in general, in the spirit of the passage cited above from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA). This approach—frightening people, rather than inciting them to fight—is hardly productive. The authors of letters supporting the article published in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT say the same thing.

"The story not only fails to prepare young people for military labor, but it also does damage to military-patriotic indoctrination. It arbitrarily rejects armed forces regulations as the inviolable foundation of army life. In Yu. Polyakov's opinion there are no wise, honest, willful people in the army. Let me ask this: Who, then, is defending the fatherland? Who is it, Comrade Polyakov, who makes it possible for you to pursue your literary activities peacefully?" writes military instructor V. Aleshin from Petrozavodsk. He states the issue in this way: Improvement of the preparation of future soldiers for the realities of army life is by itself an effective means

of improving the army environment. Does the story further this aim? And he concludes: It is capable of producing precisely the reverse effect.

This same idea is developed by Captain V. Pashkov. He refers to the story as a "manual" on how to implant unbecoming mutual relations in the troops. Asserting and exaggerating the problem, he notes, Yu. Polyakov does not uncover its roots, and most importantly, the ways of solving it. This is why "A Hundred Days Before Orders" is such an extremely weak tool for eradicating "dedovshchina."

"I was a private in the army," writes Nikolay Kotov, a young reserve soldier from Dneprodzerzhinsk. "I am grateful to the army for instilling good traits within me—the habits of discipline and order, political maturity, honesty and faithfulness to friendship. What Yu. Polyakov writes is falsehood skillfully camouflaged as truth. Such a description of our army, and of its soldiers and commanders, is simply outrageous."

Here is one more letter from Klavdiya Ivanovna Shilkova, the wife of a serviceman from Belgorod:

"Thanks to Yuriy Fedorko for taking a stand on reading the story. Could it possibly ever help to nurture our children as patriots? It inspires cruelty, disregard for the individual, and a mercenary outlook. It is excruciatingly saddening and insulting."

There are many such letters. One typical trait is that their authors, while not immune to the emotional side of the issue, nonetheless lay their main emphasis on its practical aspect, on analyzing what must be done to fight "dedovshchina," and what role literature is to play in this matter. And whether or not Yu. Polyakov's story is in keeping with this role.

I think that this is a constructive approach. To open up negative phenomena to glasnost is not a cause to panic; it does not mean relishing evil or acting in the role of an infallible third-party judge. Glasnost is the basis for serious, committed thinking. And most importantly, for purposeful and decisive action.

11004

Armed Forces 'Only Beginning' To Solve Nationalities Problem

18010425a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Maj S. Marzoyev, regiment deputy commander for political affairs, Transcaucasus Military District: "Life Makes Suggestions as to the Problems of International Education"]

[Text] There is one conversation I just cannot get out of my mind. Here is what brought it on: Discussing our society's purification of degenerate phenomena in the

course of restructuring, a young officer conducting a political lesson cited the corrupt ruling elite of Uzbekistan as an example of criminal activity. Apparently desiring to stress the "unique features" of his audience, the lieutenant commanded several of the soldiers to rise, and then said the following, word for word:

"Here are representatives of this republic. Later on they will give us the details about the 'Uzbek affair' and about why things ended up there as they did."

I thought that just a casual remark would be enough to make the lieutenant understand his error. But the political lesson group leader was sincerely amazed:

"But what did I do wrong?"

It came to me that perhaps we are missing something very important in the development of the spiritual culture of the young officer corps, if such incidents are possible. The reader may object that the lieutenant simply forgot to be tactful, which does happen to everyone. And you can't make a purse out of a sow's ear. But to reduce the discussion to just the rules of good manners means not to see the forest for the trees. There is something else of importance here—the political sensitivity of the indoctrinator, which must be sharpened many times over whenever the national self-consciousness of people is involved, even indirectly.

As I reread the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, this thought confirms itself in my mind again and again. The task posed in the theses is to get institutions of the political system to actively participate in solving the nationalities problems. I am deeply convinced that by doing so in the armed forces, we could increase the contribution made by them to the international indoctrination of the country's entire population several times over.

Where are the bottlenecks? I recall my own years as a cadet. Alas, I cannot say that it was in school that I learned my life-long lessons of delicacy, if you will, of sensibility in approaching all things which are related to these highly complex problems. We were of course taught some things. And we heard lectures on how to unify the multinational military collectives and indoctrinate subordinates in the spirit of friendship of the peoples of the USSR. We were also shown how to conduct, for example, readings from Lenin or a morning discussion on the topic "In a Unified Family." But all of this recalled—how can I say it more precisely?—a cheap popular print of a landscape crowned by a cloud-free sky, a mindless, problem-free, carefree environment. Life punishes those who are still under the spell of such simplified notions when they join the troops.

So it was for example with subunit commander Captain P. Krivosheyev. A strong, healthy collective simply could not evolve here for a long time, and discipline was

a perpetual problem. Naturally this had an effect on combat training as well. In the end it became clear that despite all of his promises, the officer was unable to change the situation.

The command and the party committee intervened. Captain Krivosheyev had let many things slip by in his indoctrination work. But there were some things that were especially alarming. Soldiers representing over a dozen nationalities were serving in the subunit. Small groups formed on the basis of land of origin—a phenomenon that is natural to the initial stage of a collective's development. But deviations from the norm began to appear as well. For example squad commanders junior sergeants F. Zakhidov and E. Melkonyan tried to gain some privileges for their compatriots when it came time to draw up the duty roster, distribute the work and so on. Signs of nationalistic chauvinism and arrogance appeared in the behavior of certain soldiers. All of this produced an immediate reaction from the other soldiers. Such "friction" harbored unpredictable consequences, and therefore the most decisive organizational and educational measures were implemented in order to normalize the situation.

Could it be, the reader may ask, that Captain Krivosheyev was blind to these anomalies in the relations between his subordinates? No, he was quite aware of them. The subunit's Komsomol members discussed the situation in their meetings. But the officer was conditioned to think in the old, stereotypic way: Nothing bad could come of this, he thought, since the nationalities question had been resolved in our country "conclusively and irreversibly." And so he took the serious problems as nothing more than children's pranks.

Have we done much of anything to break down such a stereotype in the consciousness of commanders, political workers and active party and Komsomol members? My experience in the military and in party-political work entitles me to offer a certain generalization. Let me say that we are only just beginning to seriously address these problems.

It is very important for our eyes to become keener, for our minds to become more flexible and for our perception to be more sensitive when it comes to working with people. Let us sift through our day-to-day army lexicon from this point of view. Consider how many slang expressions, names and terms insulting the national sensitivities of servicemen are in common usage! Can we say today that we have purified our speech of self-demeaning turns of phrase, or at least that we have initiated a universal, massive implacable struggle against such things, that the party organization has made a substantial contribution to the effort? Judging from my own regiment, there is nothing to be specially proud about yet. Ethnic jokes and expressions of the same "flavor" sometimes circulate among the soldiers, and even the officers.

Let me recall something that was said in this connection: "we are nationals within a large nation.... we unconsciously commit an infinite number of tyrannic and insulting acts: I need only think back to my life beside the Volga to see how we treat foreigners, how we always refer to people of Polish descent as 'Polacks,' how we always refer to Tatars as 'princes,' how we always refer to Ukrainians as 'top-knots,' and to Georgians and other Caucasian foreigners as 'Caucasians'."

Yes, those were Lenin's words. And if we measure today's positions, our attitude toward things of this sort, against Lenin's own evaluation, we would find that there are some things to think about here. And sooner or later we arrive at the conclusion that were our perception of such phenomena just as keen, were we just as intolerant of such phenomena, truly in keeping with party principles, they would be far fewer in number.

That is the first point. Second, very many of us lack tact, the ability to see the political consequences of each of our steps and deeds. The importance of shades of meaning and nuances is perhaps greater in international indoctrination than in anything else. And unthinking straightforwardness and saber rattling can only cause harm.

Here is something that happened once in our regiment. A group of young Azerbaijani soldiers in Captain Ye. Saltykov's company began refusing to eat pork dishes. Naturally this was perceived as an infraction in the company. A number of officers and junior commanders took approximately this position: Who are they to create some kind of special conditions for themselves? Is everyone going to start demanding a special menu for himself? Lieutenant Colonel V. Mamedov, the regiment deputy commander for rear services, was perplexed:

"I'm also an Azerbaijani, but from my first day in the army I have always eaten what they gave me."

Today the young soldiers look back on those days with a smile, and together with their comrades they eat heartily everything our mess hall prepares. But that incident could also have left a smarting wound behind in their memories, had they not been treated patiently, with an understanding of the easily wounded psychology of the young soldiers.

I think that there is another problem that is important to many communists. From my point of view it goes far beyond the unit and ship, and we need to solve it together. With what does respect for the national worth of the individual, and of the traditions of a given people, begin? It begins with a knowledge of the history, the economics and the spiritual and cultural life of the given people or nationality. Let us leaf through our school (and academy) texts. I think that we would agree on one thing: We acquired painfully little such knowledge. It is my deep conviction that we need to introduce a special

course into military school programs. It might be called "The History of the Peoples of the USSR," or something like that. The matter lies not in the name but in the essence.

Of course many things can also be done right within the unit to make up for these shortcomings. As I write these lines, the picture that comes to mind is that of a lieutenant crimson with rage and a confused soldier at the threshold to my office. "Comrade Major, could you please talk to him, I'm not getting anywhere." We began sorting things out. It was difficult for the officer to find a common language with his subordinate even in the literal sense—the latter's Russian was poor. And the soldier's behavior was far from exemplary. But there was something else that caused the lieutenant to lose his self-control: "He has no respect for either those senior to him or those junior to him—he refers to everyone in the familiar 'you' without exception."

What appeared to the lieutenant to be the greatest impropriety was explained very simply. The soldier's native language lacked the formal expression "thou," and he was utterly incapable of stepping over this psychological barrier. Thus we find that an officer needs to know such nuances as well. How, one begins to think, do we widen and deepen such knowledge? I recently went through all the literature available in the library on this subject. I couldn't find much.

We are of course reexamining our work. And the effort is especially tangible in this period of preparations for the 19th party conference. A regimental party conference with the agenda "On Lenin's Traditions of Nationalities Policy and the Tasks of Communists to Improve Indoctrination of Personnel in the Spirit of Friendship of Peoples" provided good encouragement. Communists noted that much ground had been lost in this area because in the period of stagnation, indoctrination of soldiers in the spirit of friendship of peoples of the USSR was based more on slogans and theoretical propositions. But what is really needed is a connection with real life.

But even here we collide with problems that cannot be solved at the regiment level. For example in order that our efforts would not appear to be arbitrary, it is high time to introduce the nationalities problem into the commander training program.

Interesting advances are also being made in international indoctrination of the soldiers. Take for example the company in which Lieutenant A. Borisik is the political worker. Every visit by parents is made into a mini-holiday for the entire collective. This brings the people closer together and helps them get to know each other better. During the well-publicized events in Nagornyy Karabakh, the company in which Captain S. Kozlov is the head of the party organization organized a discussion of V. I. Lenin's letter "To Comrade Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan and the Gorskaya Republic," which was written in 1921 but which is

still pertinent today. Such functions were also carried out in other subunits. Useful experience has been created in printing publications in the languages of different peoples of the USSR, and in establishing ties with local party and soviet organs and cultural officials of the Transcaucasian republics.

What do we await from the 19th All-Union Party Conference? We hope that all of these problems will be analyzed deeply there.

Not that long ago we had some visitors, and it became my extreme pleasure to take care of them. Students of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze came to the garrison for their apprenticeship—Ukrainian Captain A. Petrzhikovskiy, Tatar Major R. Yunusov and Armenian Captain Yu. Mordyan. Some time ago, the fortunes of war had brought us all together in the same battalion in Afghanistan. It came to me that these were people who knew the true value of military brotherhood, of a sense of closeness in the ranks. "What about discussing this with my subordinates?" I asked my friends one day. "If we must, then we must," Yuriy Mordyan smiled. This was exactly what he used to say whenever he went out on the most important combat assignments.

11004

Frunze Hosts 1st Young Reservists Meeting
18010425h Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 13 May 88 p 1

[Article by correspondent A. Kim: "The Soldiers Are Back in the Ranks"]

[Text] The first republic assembly of young reserve soldiers was opened in the capital of Kirghizia.

Over 250 young men who had completed their mandatory term of service in the Soviet Army and Navy and had now returned to their peaceful occupations convened in Frunze. Most of the men had served in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The participants of the assembly wore orders and medals for bravery and courage on their chests.

It all began half a year ago with the First All-Union Assembly of Reserve Soldiers in Ashkhabad. The groundwork for the present movement was laid there, where soldier-internationalists living in Kirghizia came together and became acquainted with each other. They founded their own "Motherland Club," which became the center of military-patriotic work among young people. Today over 500 students are successfully preparing for military service in the club's subunits.

In the course of 4 days the reserve soldiers will refresh themselves in army science—attacking, firing small arms and lobbing grenades. But most importantly they will study the experience of the presently existing military-patriotic associations and take this experience back home. Yesterday's soldiers will take part in instructor training lessons, and they will meet with the republic's active Komsomol members and young people. There will be hard debates, talks and round table discussions during the assembly. Their main goal is to find new ways and approaches to train the motherland's future defenders and to widely encourage young reserve soldiers to participate in this work.

11004

'Strategic Balance' Assessment Analyzed

PM2707134288 Moscow APN MILITARY
BULLETIN in English No 12, Jun 88 pp 6-11

[Article by Doctor of Technical Sciences Vitaliy Tsygichko, expert at the USSR Academy of Sciences Research Institute of System Studies: "An Evaluation of the Strategic Balance in Europe" First 12 paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text]

From the Editors

With the article by Doctor Vitaliy Tsygichko "What Balance Are We Discussing in Vienna?" (MILITARY BULLETIN, No 11, 1988) we begin a new series linked with the talks on cuts in conventional troops and weapons in Europe.

The fact that there was no objective estimate of the real alignment of forces between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO complicates the attainment of a compromise solution in this sphere.

In this situation we regard as constructive Vitaliy Tsygichko's proposal to compare the combat potential of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO forces by means of mathematical simulation of the processes of armed struggle. He believes that simulated models are used for assessing and choosing military and political targets and priorities, working out military strategy, formulating the tasks of their solution, adopting concepts for the development of the armed forces.

At present the theory and methods of mathematic simulation are in an advanced stage already. More and more books are being devoted to this subject and it is being discussed at international conferences.

However, a switch-over of talks to this foundation would require solution of a whole number of scientific, theoretical, organizational and technical problems. Difficulties may arise during the adoption and use of a single model (or models) for assessing the alignment of forces between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO because each side is most likely to come up with its own version. Meanwhile, the adoption of a single model at the talks would help achieve equal security despite any differences in troops and weapons.

Vitaliy Tsygichko maintains that the sides should negotiate the following:

- figures pertaining to the strategic equilibrium between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO;
- a type of mathematical model and a level of generalization;
- assumptions and restrictions adopted in a model;

—basic information for simulation;

—methods of using a model in the process of talks;

—scenarios of a possible war in Europe, within the framework of which the sides will assess figures pertaining to the strategic equilibrium and some other questions.

Following is the second article on the subject.

To find objective quantitative marks of the strategic balance in Europe acceptable both for the Warsaw Pact and NATO and methods of their calculation, a clear definition of the term "strategic balance" or SB is needed. For their requirements to the mathematical models of hostilities and to the contents of the scenarios under which they are computed.

A possible starting point for defining the notion of SB is the postulate of "guaranteed security" of the sides on any foreseeable situation in Europe. "Guaranteed security" shall be understood as the ability of each side to counter the attempts by the other side to wage offensive operations in the worst conditions for the defending side like, say, in the case of a surprise attack by the hypothetical enemy. In that case SB implies a situation where each side cannot undertake offensive action because such an attempt would involve unacceptable losses in manpower and materiel. If this interpretation of SB is accepted by the sides, the problem will then boil down to the definition of an acceptable range in the alignment of the sides' forces, within which guaranteed security of each side is attainable.

A quantitative assessment of the alignment of the sides' forces ensuring guaranteed security can be made by the more recent armed conflicts. That experience is reflected both in combat manuals and in other war regulations. According to the contemporary views, the attacking side must have an at least 5:1 edge in the alignment of first-echelon forces in the direction of the main attack. The question is how to establish a general acceptable alignment of forces in Europe and the conditions which will prevent both sides from building the necessary edge for an attack in any direction of the European theatre, which means that SB will be maintained.

This is a difficult theoretical problem which can only be resolved by mathematical modelling of hostilities under different scenarios of a hypothetical war in Europe. The models must reflect in sufficient detail the time and space dynamics of the armed struggle. They must take into consideration the combat strength and the operational deployment of the sides' forces in potential operations, the troops' combat readiness by the start of the hostilities, troop mobility factors, combat effectiveness of weapons, ways and standard characteristics of their combat use, modes of troops' actions and interaction in hostilities, and effectiveness of intelligence and command.

If a model takes into proper account the said factors and conditions, it can help evaluate the actual capabilities or the potential of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in waging offensive operations in different conditions of the beginning and of the course of war in Europe, and delineate the SB zone ensuring guaranteed security of the sides. The model will help make qualitative assessments of the sides' proposals and work out compromise decisions with clear understanding of their consequences.

If the sides come to terms on the model and initial data for modelling, a general pattern for locating the SB zone can be as follows. Each side construes the worst scenario of the beginning of war for itself and decides with the help of the model the correlation of the sides' potentials guaranteeing the impossibility of offensive operations by the other side. Thus we will get a margin in the correlation of the sides' potential where SB is guaranteed.

Next, each side figures out the actual potential of the other side under the same scenarios and the actual correlation of the potentials. If that correlation does not overreach the pre-modelled SB margin, then talks can centre on measures involving mutual troop reductions by the sides which naturally should not upset SB. If either side has an advantage, the task of the first stage of negotiations will be agreement on the attainment of SB: i.e. reduction of troops by the side which has the advantage or creation of conditions under which the said advantage disappears—for example, through the exclusion of conditions for a surprise attack.

In the latter case, the scenario must be reviewed and a new margin in the alignment of the potentials guaranteeing SB must be computed. In other words, the proposed approach helps evaluate the impact on SB of both the actual strength of the sides' troops and of the conditions of their potential employment and offers an opportunity for constructive talks on the terms of guaranteeing security (mutual verification, warning procedures, etc.). Mathematical models of hostilities have made it possible to explore some of the more general dependences of the magnitude of the SB zone on the absolute magnitude of the compared potentials and other factors and conditions of armed struggle. For example, with the absence of conditions for a surprise attack resulting from a reduction of the absolute potentials, the SB zone grows larger because the more troops, the more there are opportunities for their concentration in a particular direction, and the lower the threshold of guaranteed security (fig. 2). Besides, the higher the potentials of the sides, the heavier the impact on the results of probable hostilities of such factors as troop mobility, reconnaissance, the standard of command and so on.

To safeguard oneself against probable inaccuracies in the modelling of hostilities and in the programming of initial data and against other sources of errors, the sides may agree to narrow down the SB zone to a zone of guaranteed SB. It is within the framework of that latter zone that negotiations should be conducted.

One spinoff of the delineation of the guaranteed SB zone is the possibility to project simpler models for determining the relationship between the sides' potentials and for finding compromises at negotiations.

Lt Gen Makunin on Improving Legality in Moscow MD

18010394b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen A. Makunin, member of the military council, chief of the political administration of the Moscow Military District]

[Text] As was already reported, an experiment in improving legal work is being completed in the Moscow Military District. For 2 years in a row the larger and smaller units and military commissariats of the district legal experts have worked day after day helping the commanders, political agencies and staffs to strengthen law and order among the troops. And what has been the result? Our correspondent discusses this with a member of the military council and the chief of the district political administration, Lt Gen A. Makunin.

[Question] First of all, Comrade Lt Gen, why was the experiment necessary? After all, even without this strengthening of the legal system and law and order has always occupied an important place in the activity of military personnel.

[Answer] Yes, undoubtedly, strengthening the legal system and law and order is a necessary condition for a high level of organization, smooth interaction, and solidarity of military collectives and for a responsible attitude on the part of each military serviceman toward his duties. The combat readiness of the troops depends largely on this. But these correct words have far from always been reinforced by deeds and the commanding officer frequently does not have real legal assistance when resolving one issue or another. And yet he holds a great deal of power and has considerable material means at his disposal. It is not difficult to imagine the cost of mistakes or false steps in applying legislation. And is it not strange that the one-man commander has assistants for political work, for rear support, for physical training, but none for legal work, which comprises the essence of all his activity and has become very complicated today?

[Question] And what did the experiment show? Were the hopes placed in the assistance of legal consultants justified?

[Answer] Completely. Recently we discussed the results of the experiment in the district military council. The opinion of all the commanding officers, political workers, and other officials who worked with the legal experts is unanimous: permanent legal assistance that is qualified and prompt has an extremely favorable effect.

But here are the objective data. Last year military procurators in the district protested 208 official orders that contradicted the requirements of the laws and regulations. But in places where legal experts were working there were only three protests. And two of these three documents were issued in spite of recommendations

from legal consultants. In these large and smaller units there was a marked reduction of the number of crimes, incidents, and gross violations of discipline. And this is all against a background of the constantly growing demandingness of our command and political personnel, when we are recording today what we might not have noticed yesterday. With the help of legal consultants practically all the material harm for which military service personnel, workers, and employees are to blame is being reimbursed to the state.

[Question] But, Comrade Lt Gen, are you not overestimating the significance of one person for the work of the entire collective?

[Answer] I think not. Of course, the results I mentioned were the fruit of joint efforts of commanding officers, political workers, and party and social organizations. But the appearance of a legal expert in the administration and the staff, as the experiment showed, changes the style of people's work. They begin to think about the correctness and legality of their actions and decisions not when someone points out to them that they have made a mistake, but directly during the course of their work, when making the decision. That is, their own legal consciousness begins to work actively. In a word, the legal expert becomes a kind of catalyst for positive processes in the military collective. Incidentally, the changes for the better that are taking place where the experiment is being conducted are shown by the fact that there has been a sharp reduction of the number of complaints from these units and subdivisions and a reduction of the number of people who have had to go to see their corresponding superiors.

[Question] And what now? How will the results of the experiment be realized?

[Answer] The military council has made a decision to petition the competent agencies to include legal consultants on the permanent staff. We hope that our proposals will be accepted.

11772

Major Complaints of 'Protectionism' in Distribution of Choice Duty Assignments

18010394a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Major Ye. Turkov]

[Text] I get the impression that the principles of social justice, about which so much has been written in the press recently, are not for all military servicemen. And believe me, I am not saying this in the heat of the moment, although I am deeply offended by it. But here is the thing.

My tour of duty in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany is coming to an end. And I have now found out that I am being transferred to the Transbaykal Military District although I served previously for 5 years in the Arctic. As we know, my tour of duty in Transbaykal was long. I am now 35. This means that practically until the time I go into the reserves...

Some people might say: it is not good to envy one's friends... Of course not! I simply want to understand why, for example, certain comrades who have never served in remote regions are again being posted to the central districts? What is this—protectionism or something else? I took the oath and I know that a military serviceman must staunchly bear all the difficulties and deprivations of military service. But the oath is the same for everyone, so why do some people spend most of their lives—excuse me—in god-forsaken ends of the earth while others get to stay in metropolitan areas?

For example, my predecessor had been nowhere except the Moscow Military District before he came to the GSFG, and when he was replaced he was sent back there. And he was sent back 4 months early because there was a vacant higher position that urgently needed filling. I have nothing against him, believe me: he is a sensible, intelligent officer. And if he were the only one! But I can name dozens of cases like this...

Incidentally, I am convinced that it is possible to find very weighty arguments to justify my transfer, as they say, to the end of the earth again...

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Central Military Medical Directorate Chief on Health Problems in Military

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[Interview with Col Gen of Medical Service F. Komarov, academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the USSR State Prize, chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Col A. Nekrylov, correspondent]

[Text] The magazine editorial staff receives many letters in which the readers are interested in the fact that the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers approved the "Basic Directions for the Development of Public Health Protection and Restructuring of Public Health in the USSR Under the 12th Five-Year Plan and the Period up to the Year 2000," what is being done to improve the state of affairs in military medicine, and how the restructuring of the work of the military medical service is proceeding. Our correspondent Col A. Nekrylov asked Academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the

USSR State Prize, chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col Gen of the Medical Service F. Komarov to answer a number of questions.

[Question] Comrade colonel general, we know that concern for the health of the troops is also concern for the combat readiness of the units and ships. What is being done today to improve the medical service for the troops?

[Answer] In the Armed Forces over the past few years we have implemented large, scientifically substantiated measures directed toward improving the system of therapeutic-preventive work of the medical service. They have touched upon all aspects of the problem—the organizational-staff structure, the material and technical base, and the professional training of personnel. Special attention has been devoted to the line unit medical service. During the past 10 years we have constructed many standard medical points and therapeutic-diagnostic facilities... Measures have been taken to improve the professional training of the staff doctors, and the therapeutic practice of line unit doctors has improved. The level of preventive medical and therapeutic-diagnostic work has risen in many units and combined units, and a system of dispensaries has been formed.

At the same time one must admit that far from everything has been done to protect the health of military service personnel so far. In particular, we are not taking full advantage of the great possibilities of therapeutic-diagnostic work that exist today in the military area of medical service. Recently there have been many complaints about the level of diagnostic work at the regimental medical points of the Central Asian, Transbaykal, Ural, and Volga military districts and the Northern and Southern groups of forces. And this is in spite of the fact that in many of them we have created laboratories and offices for functional diagnosis, and medical workers with sufficiently high qualifications are working there.

Preventive medical work is also in need of radical improvement, particularly dispensary facilities for personnel, anti-epidemic measures, and especially sanitary supervision. In a number of districts, groups of forces, and fleets, problems of preventing acute pneumonia are critical. I am speaking about this because a study of the causes of pneumonia has shown that all of them amount basically to shortcomings in prevention, namely allowing the personnel to get too cold as a result of not always efficient organization of training and field maneuvers and work under conditions with low temperatures. According to available data, almost 40 percent of those suffering from acute pneumonia are young soldiers in their first few months of service. One can also see the results of cases of late hospitalization of patients suffering from acute respiratory diseases and their poor quality and short-term treatment in line unit infirmaries.

The Basic Directions for Improvement of Health Protection for the Population and Restructuring of Public Health in the USSR Under the 12th Five-Year Plan and During the Period up to the Year 2000, earmarked by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers for development of military health, open up new possibilities. First and foremost, preventive medical work should be placed on the highest level. This has been and still is the general policy for Soviet public health. It is easier to prevent illness and injury than it is to treat them. Of course the most important task is still for each medical worker to participate actively in the struggle for a healthy way of life and against drunkenness and alcoholism. The battle against this evil should be waged constantly, in interaction with the command, political agencies, legal experts, and party and komsomol organizations. And this pertains particularly to regimental doctors, those who are constantly among the people.

[Question] Since our conversation has already moved on to a more practical basis, I should like to ask about this. Not so long ago when I was in a motorized infantry regiment where Lt Col R. Zimaliyev serves I asked about how the regimental medical point operates here. The medical point turned out to be a modern, permanent, two-story building with excellently equipped therapy rooms, a sick bay, and rooms where the patients could rest. Everything around sparkled with cleanliness and one could sense a real concern for the troops. And all this, as Lt Col Zimaliyev explained, is financed through internal reserves. In this connection one is struck with the thought: probably in the matter of medical support for military servicemen and their families a good deal depends on the position of the commander and how he himself meets the requirements of the regulations?

[Answer] There is no doubt that concern for protecting and strengthening the health of the personnel is a regulation duty of commanders and political workers. At the present time medical points are constructed for regiments according to standard plans, and we have no shortage of the modern medical equipment necessary for examining and treating patients. And in places where the commanding officers devote the proper attention to the work of the medical service and where the doctors show initiative they find additional possibilities of creating comfortable conditions in the medical points, organizing therapeutic nutrition for the patients, and providing them with newspapers and artistic literature.

Unfortunately, this kind of mutual understanding is far from always there. One encounters leaders who do not understand one simple thing: the health of the troops is an indicator of the work not only of the medical service, but also of the commanding officer. And how frequently, for example, when summing up the results of combat or political training for the half year do they turn the floor over to the regimental or ship doctor so that he can analyze the condition of medical support for the personnel and discuss the problems he faces in connection with this? Not very often.

Or take the activity of political agencies and party organizations. Who if not they should know the needs of the people and live with their concerns? But as line unit practice shows, certain political workers and secretaries of party committees and party bureaus are not very interested in how medical aid is organized for the personnel and families of military servicemen. Do they not wish to take an interest? Or perhaps they were not taught about this? At meeting and seminars and during the course of other measures where they consider forms and methods of party political work the discussion is rarely if ever about medical service. And communists remain silent about this at party meetings. They say there are more important things to worry about. But can people's health really be something secondary?

[Question] Among the troops there are sometimes cases where doctors are being used for other jobs. Some of them are put in charge of vehicles for shipping cargo, in charge of patrols, and so forth. Quite understandably, the medical service gains nothing from this. And all this is done with the knowledge of the commanding officer or political worker. Should not something be done to protect the military medic from being given assignments that have nothing to do with the nature of his regular activity?

[Answer] Yes, the doctor should be freed of everything that does not fall within the range of his responsibilities. At the same time I am far from thinking that doctors should be exempted from combat training life and the activity of the line unit collectives. Today the times dictate with all possible persistence that high demands must be placed not only on those officials who are responsible for the sanitary condition of the food and water supply facilities and communal and bath-laundry services, but also on medical service specialists. It is necessary to use all available means to develop in line unit doctors militancy and an uncompromising attitude toward all negative phenomena that have a negative effect on the health of the personnel.

The time for office doctors has passed. What is needed now is a combat medic with a clearly expressed active position in life. In order to be in time to prevent disease and injuries, he must learn the conditions of the daily life of the military servicemen and take effective measures to prevent the unfavorable influence of occupational hazards on their health and provide for a given level of inhabitability of the military facilities. The elimination of the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES—when it was necessary to implement a complex of sanitary-hygienic measures directed toward reducing the radiation exposure and the preventing cases of excessive radiation of personnel—showed how critical the problem of occupational hazards and protection from them can be. And to do this, of course, the military medic must always be in the thick of things: on the march, in tactical training, and when performing complicated assignments and doing various kinds of jobs. In a word, he must be

among the people, know and understand what they are doing, and give his assistance when necessary. In the language of the medic this means to see the causes (etiology) of the diseases.

It is another matter when some regimental doctors are not prepared for this. This is why today we are faced with the problem of restructuring the training of military doctors. Apparently it is necessary to reject many traditional ideas and look for new forms and methods of training so that the graduates of the Military Medical Academy and the military medical departments of institutes will be able to perform all of their duties from the first days of their service. What do we have in mind? People in courses and classes should master the practical skills necessary for organizing and conducting preventive and therapeutic-diagnostic work at the regimental medical point. The improvement of the training of military doctors will undoubtedly also be promoted by the fact that in the near future it is planned to introduce annual specialization of graduates in therapy institutions immediately after they finish the military medical VUZ, that is, we actually plan to extend the length of the education in departments for training doctors in the academy and in military medical departments of institutes to 7 years.

[Question] Comrade colonel general, I should especially like to touch upon the work of military therapeutic institutions. As our reader mail shows, there are many shortcomings here. The quality of treatment in certain medical battalions and garrison hospitals leaves something to be desired, and there are also many complaints about the activity of the garrison polyclinics. There are various reasons for this. Sometimes they do not have enough medical personnel or the necessary equipment, and as a result it is impossible to conduct a thorough examination and the planned therapeutic and health improvement measures are not carried out. One can also see the effect from the adherence to old forms of work and rigid organization which make it impossible to develop initiative and impede creative research. Are any changes taking place in military medicine in the regard? If so, tell us, please, the collectives where the restructuring is actually taking place actively.

[Answer] Providing military service personnel with prompt and high-quality medical aid is an important area of the work of the Central Military Medical Directorate. The efforts of its communists today are directed toward creating in each garrison, in each unit, and in each combined unit an efficient system of diagnosis, first aid, and outpatient treatment. We are succeeding in some of these things and in some we are not. There are reasons for this as well. And at our conferences and party meetings we discuss them frankly and thoroughly, in the spirit of democratism and openness. We call things by their real names and are very hard on those who do not wish to work in the new way. A great deal of attention is now being devoted to questions of long-range planning, strengthening control, and rendering practical assistance on the spot. We are revising the criteria for evaluating the activity of the medical service and improving other

forms and methods of management activity. But we are still a long way from complete restructuring, although the methods for restructuring have been determined: we have earmarked measures for the 12th Five-Year Plan and up to the year 2000 which have been approved by the USSR Ministry of Defense. There are undoubtedly problems and there is much work to do in order to straighten them out.

As for a concrete example, one can mention the polyclinic headed by Honored Physician of the RSFSR, Col of the Medical Service V. Yevtushenko. This collective has actually entered on the path to updating all of its work. Consultation-diagnostic centers are now being created there. What are they? Life has shown that one of the future directions for the development of specialized medical aid is the creation of regional clinical centers on the basis of the best district military hospitals and polyclinics. These centers will have the most modern equipment and techniques as well as highly qualified personnel, and they will be used not only for rendering medical assistance to patients but also for increasing the qualifications of various categories of medical personnel. The consultation-diagnostic center based on the military medical institution headed by Yevtushenko is the only one in the Armed Forces so far, but, as they say, a beginning has been made.

Specialists of the sanitary-epidemiological detachment of the Leningrad Military District headed by Col of the Medical Service V. Tararin have begun to restructure their work appreciably in keeping with modern requirements. They are persistently eliminating shortcomings in the conditions for the life and combat training of the troops. As a result, over the past years in the district they have consistently maintained a good epidemiological condition, and the level of spreading of infectious diseases is fairly low. I should especially like to take note of the work of the Tashkent District Hospital imeni P. F. Borovskiy, whose chief is Col of the Medical Service S. Bazhan. The collective of this therapeutic institution is sparing no efforts to render specialized medical aid to the troops of the district and international combat personnel. For the results for 1987 the hospital was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the military district soviet.

[Question] Sanitary-health resort treatment. The readers are disturbed about two aspects here: the material and technical base of the sanitariums and the distribution of passes to military health facilities. As concerns the former, I myself recently had occasion to observe a fairly dismal picture in the sanitarium of the Moscow District Air Defense unit. Builders had laid the foundation for a residential facility to accommodate 250 as far back as 2 years ago. By now they were to have assimilated more than half of the sum allotted for the construction. But they had assimilated only 15 percent of it. And the construction, to use the poignant expression of the sanitarium personnel, has become a long-term project. And many other sanitariums have similar long-term construction projects. And as a result of this, naturally, they are slow in improving the quality of treatment and

recreation for military service personnel and their families. Who is to blame for this; is it just the construction workers?

[Answer] The Army and Navy are constantly are constantly working to strengthen the material and technical base and increase the number of beds at military sanitariums and rest homes. During the past 10 years about 300 million rubles have been spent for these purposes, which made it possible to construct and renovate 47 dormitories, 27 treatment facilities, 21 dining rooms, 14 clubs, 5 swimming complexes and a number of other facilities. The following new rest homes have been put into operation: the Mozhayskiy, which accommodates 350, in the Moscow area, and the Peschanoye, which accommodates 200, in the Crimea. During the past two five-year plans the number of beds in military sanitariums and rest homes has increased by 4,500. All this has made it possible to considerably improve the material and technical base in military sanitariums and rest homes.

Under the 12th Five-Year Plan and the period up to the year 2000 it is intended to assimilate significant allocations for the development of the material and technical base of military health facilities. During this time it is intended to construct and put into operation nine and to begin construction on two new sanitarium complexes at health resorts on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and the Far East and 100 dormitories at existing health facilities. Opportunities for rest with children will be expanded. Conditions for sanitarium treatment for veterans of the Armed Forces will be improved considerably. Unfortunately, in many sanitariums under district jurisdiction and at the Khabarovsk, Odessa, and Leningrad sanitariums the material and technical base still does not meet the requirements of the present day and it is being improved slowly. There are many dilapidated buildings and dormitory facilities without the necessary communal conveniences. In a number of cases the construction of sanitarium facilities is intolerably slow and lags significantly behind the planned assignments (the Sukhumskiy sanitarium of the Air Defense Forces of the Ministry of Defense, Rizhskoye vzmorye of the Baltic Military District, and the Shmakovskiy of the Far East Military District). The construction of a sanitarium complex has been postponed for many years in Borzhomi (Transcaucasus Military District) and Tarkhovka (Leningrad Military District).

[Question] A no less burning issue is the distribution of passes. Many readers express this wish regarding this: priority should be given to people involved in the performance of combat duties and difficult conditions. For we must admit that during the best months of the year in our health facilities one frequently encounters young people who have nothing to do with the army. How do we impose order? People are sending in this suggestion: in each polyclinic there should be posted for general viewing lists (by name) of people given passes to health facilities. Is this feasible?

[Answer] Unfortunately, today it is impossible to provide sanitarium-health resort treatment for all those who need it. The existing number of beds in military health facilities makes it possible to provide passes to sanitariums and rest homes for 50-60 percent of the officers on active duty, 18-20 percent of those in the reserve and retirement, and a considerably smaller percentage for their families. There is another factor that is also of considerable importance. The influx of those who wish to go to health facilities comes, as a rule, during the summer months. Here is an example. Recently I was on a business trip in the Transbaykal Military District and spoke with officers and members of their families. Among the many wishes pertaining to improvement of their lives, I heard also about passes: no, they said, who knows where they go? Perhaps to the outside. Right there I offered them passes to any sanitarium, from December through April. And what do you think? I could not find a single person who wanted one. All of them want to take vacation during the summer with their children.

According to the existing provisions, when passes are distributed preference is given to people with chronic illnesses and also military service personnel whose work involves their being regularly affected by unfavorable factors of military labor (personnel in service afloat in submarine and surface ships, air force flight personnel, alert forces of strategic missile units, and personnel in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the Republic of Afghanistan). As concerns posting lists of people requiring health resort treatment and also those who have received passes to sanitariums and rest homes, this would hardly be expedient. The distribution of passes to military sanitariums and rest homes is done by the sanitarium selection commissions in the troop units and institutions, taking medical indications into account. The commissions include doctors and representatives of the command, political agencies, and public organizations, as well as Army and Navy veterans. It is a different matter that there are sometimes interruptions in this work because certain people are not conscientious or honorable, and they must be called to account for this. The work of the sanitarium selection commissions should be under the constant supervision of the command, political agencies, and the public. We must demand quite categorically that the responsible individuals observe the norms of communist morality. The Central Military Medical Directorate has many complaints about the work of the sanitarium selection commissions. To a considerable degree they are to blame for the fact that many passes go unused. And this when there is shortage of them.

Improving the protection of the health of the Soviet fighting man is one of the important tasks under army conditions. Performing it requires immense efforts from commanders, political agencies, party organizations, military therapeutic institutions, and army doctors for highly skilled provision of medical aid.

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Tretyak Interview on Occasion of Air Defense Forces Day

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[Interview with General of the Army I. Tretyak, USSR deputy minister of defense: "Vigilantly Guarding the Skies at Home"]

[Text] 10 April 1988 is Air Defense Forces Day. They have been given a task of extreme state importance—to be constantly combat-ready and to protect vigilantly and reliably the air defense lines and the conquests of socialism. On the screens of radar stations, the control panels of missile complexes, at the airports and command points guards are standing watch over our air boundaries. They are filled with resolve to mark the year of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the 70th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces with real achievements in combat and political training, strengthening of discipline, and socialist competition. On the eve of Air Defense Forces Day the editorial staff asked the commander in chief of the air defense troops, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and General of the Army I. Tretyak to answer a number of questions.

[Question] Comrade General, as you know, in November of last year the Soviet people and members of the army and navy festively celebrated the 70th anniversary of Great October and in public opinion there was an immense response to this signing in December of the agreement between the USSR and the United States to eliminate medium and short-range missiles. Recently our armed forces were 70 years old. All this naturally left its mark on the mood of the personnel and the political and moral atmosphere in the military collectives. What, in your opinion, is the most typical thing here?

[Answer] A steady course toward restructuring, social and political enthusiasm, and an orientation toward practical deeds—this is the way one can characterize the atmosphere in the combined units and smaller units of the air defense forces. The anniversary of Great October and of the USSR Armed Forces enabled us not only to comprehensively evaluate what has been done, but also to earmark the most important measures and long-term directions for work in the future.

It has been correctly stated that without the past there is no future. The past is experience, but the past is also lessons. They have something to add to their unquestionable assets. But there are also many unsolved problems. The results and lessons of the 1987 school year revealed unutilized reserves and serious omissions in solving combat training problems.

The requirements of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee ...armed forces, improved management of the troops, put a stop to any infringements on the

sovereignty of the Soviet state are of fundamental significance to us. These requirements lie at the basis of the activity of the military councils, commanders, staffs, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, and all servicemen. The policy of restructuring has had a favorable effect on the state of affairs in the military collectives and it contributes to activating the creative potential of the military servicemen and the search for new approaches to solving the problems facing them in the current training year.

Today the workers' motto has become a principled, uncompromising exactingness at all levels, and the truth about the state of affairs, be it ever so bitter. It is sufficient to say that in the course of the recently conducted party meetings concerning the course of restructuring, the work of ten party bureaus was declared unsatisfactory, and 226 activists were expelled from the ranks of the party elective organs [vyborne partyinye organy] for vital shortcomings in their work. This is one of the signs of our times. Another is in the sharp turn around in military training, upbringing, the social sphere, and making time for the individual who defends the airspace of the motherland.

As concerns the agreement between the USSR and the United States concerning elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles, its signing received the full support of the men in our branch of the armed forces. We are all glad about this breakthrough into the future. We are also glad about the fact that the new foreign political concept developed by the 27th CPSU Congress has been given material embodiment in the area of nuclear disarmament as well. But as we see, events of recent times again and again confirm the truth of Lenin's conclusion that imperialism is the source of wars and the military threat. See with what feverish haste the reactionary circles of NATO work out plans for filling in the "nuclear gaps" in Western Europe, which are purportedly the result of signing the agreement. This demands from the PVO soldiers great vigilance and constant readiness to defend that which has been won by socialism. And although hopeful signs about the healthy recovery of the international situation have appeared, a warming in the political atmosphere in the world has occurred, we, speaking Lenin's language, are obliged to keep our powder dry. Furthermore, considering the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, we realize that the role of the PVO troops in our country's defensive network is continually growing. All our people understand this.

[Question] The PVO troops in the course of their existence have travelled a glorious military path. The PVO troops, like personnel from the other Soviet military services, have formed their own traditions. But does it not seem to you, Comrade General of the Army, that in recent years a definite part of these traditions has, as we say, become tarnished? In your view, what do the commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations have to do in order to correct the situation, to convert in practice, military traditions into a powerful means for the activation of the human factor?

[Answer] Using military traditions to make personnel more active, of course, requires the most constant attention. I shall give this example. In May of last year the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA discussed the feat of the Military Pilot 1st Class Lt Col A. Levchenko in Afghanistan. When neutralizing the air defense of the "ghosts," Anatoliy Nikolayevich was wounded and his aircraft was damaged. The brave flier made a decision to risk his life to destroy the enemy and directed his combat aircraft to the positions they held. For this feat Lt Col A. Levchenko was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Is it really possible to separate this military episode from the "fiery battering rams" of Nikolay Gastello and his followers during the Great Patriotic War? The link between the times and the succession of traditions have remained stable and inviolate. Faithfulness to military traditions, if one may express it that way, lies in the very "genetic code" of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the Air Defense Forces.

We need traditions not only to respect them, but also to inherit them and develop them. A good slogan, "The paths of the fathers are the roads of the sons" has lost some of its freshness because of excessive use, but it still grasps the very essence of traditions just as precisely! I cannot approve of the fact that certain of them in our day seem to have been lost in the flight of time and have lost their clear boundaries. But if we are to speak on this subject in any case it is not about "devaluation" of traditions but of a shortage of responsibility on the part of certain officials for the organization of heroic patriotic education. It must be admitted that the following also happens. On the eve of a celebration there are meetings with war veterans and they hasten to report that this area of the educational process is at the highest level.

Of course the dialectic is that traditions cannot remain unchanged and with the course of time they are enriched with new content and are manifested in different forms. Take, for example, the mass heroism of air defense forces in the battle for the homeland. Now we are in a time of peace. But M. Gorkiy was right a thousand times in asserting that there is always room for heroic deeds in life. Today's heroism is distinct from that of wartime rarely borders on sacrificing one's life. It is more frequently embodied in self-sacrificing military labor. Although even now when performing combat training problems or their international duty there are frequent cases of heroic actions on the part of our troops. So the traditions are alive and the traditions are developing. But when they are used for propaganda and education of our troops we must make them more specific and, I would say, integrated so that their creative charge will never die out, neither during holidays nor during the daily military routine.

[Question] We frequently say that a high level of military readiness of air defense forces should be an indispensable law of their life. You could probably give dozens of

examples of self-sacrificing actions on the part of troops today to halt attempts on the part of our enemies to violate USSR airspace. At the same time all of us have fresh in our memories the events of May of last year involving the illegal flight of a foreign sports plane over the territory of the USSR. What practical conclusions have been drawn so that such a thing is not repeated?

[Answer] As I have already noted, in May of last year the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee gave a principled, pointed evaluation to this incident which was unprecedented from all viewpoints. Air defense forces were shown the need to increase vigilance, to act more decisively, and to strengthen discipline, organization and responsibility at all levels. During the time that has passed since this incident practical measures have been taken directed at fighting against the serious omissions that have accumulated in the training of troops as well as phenomena of stagnation in training and educational personnel. We should like to specially emphasize the fact that these measures are not of a one-time or immediate nature. We have developed and are implementing a target program for improvement of air defense forces which includes a complex of political, organizational, educational, and personnel talks for intensification and restructuring of all spheres of life and combat activity of the larger and smaller units. The implementation of this program has begun in all units of the military organism from above to below.

In particular, in all military collectives we have conducted an analysis of the composition and capability of alert forces and air defense means in order to refine the methods of their action to stop possible violations of USSR state boundaries, including by light motor aircraft. It should be noted that the fight against such flying equipment has its own specific features and therefore we are devoting special attention to training personnel for this. As of today a considerable number of fliers have solid skills for working on low-speed, small targets at low altitudes. The number of crews trained for these tasks is constantly increasing. We have also organized additional training for officers of agencies for combat management, for calculations of radar stations, and other specialists. We have completed providing engineering equipment for tactical orders of battle in order to take better advantage of the tactical and technical possibilities of combat complexes. We are working out questions of improving the interaction between forces and means participating in solving problems of air defense.

Of course we cannot list them all in a brief conversation. A good deal has already been done but there is still a large amount of hard work in front of us. It is also important that we have actually established in the forces the principle of learning what will be necessary in war. The style and methods of the activity of management command and political personnel for increasing the combat readiness and combat potential of air defense forces is improving.

[Question] It is known that combat alert duty is a combat task of statewide importance. In this connection special responsibility is placed on the commanders, staff officers, and management units for the speed and competence of decisions that are made and irreproachable combat interaction. Which specific adjustments directed toward increasing responsibility of communist leaders for the quality of alert duty have been made in the practice of the work of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations?

[Answer] The borders of our country's air space extend over 60,000 kilometers. For comparison let us say that this is 1.5 times the length of the earth's equator. This boundary is not a straight line: it includes seas and mountains and forests and marshes. The eternal frost and subtropics, ice and desert sands leave their imprint on the organization of the fulfillment of the combat task and the law of the USSR state border. But only in the sense that its fulfillment is a very complicated and responsible matter.

Everyone understands that the quality of combat alert duty is determined to a decisive degree by the results of the activity of the management command-political personnel and officers of the staffs and military management agencies. Therefore the military council, the political administration, and the main staff attach primary significance to work with communist leaders. During past months management personnel have been assigned to the large and small units. Specialists involved in alert duty have been recertified. Those officers of combat administrative agencies who do not meet modern requirements are transferred to other positions or released into the reserves.

We have refined documents that regulate the organization and the performance of alert duty. We have conducted numerous surprise inspections of the readiness of the alert forces. We have revised and approved a new ritual for changing of the guard of the state border, which is now conducted by the commanders or their deputies personally. It provides for an atmosphere of emotional concern for qualitative performance of the task that has been set and it gives the man a charge of activity and a high level of political and military vigilance.

A good deal is being done to improve the moral incentives for the personnel. For example, in the military collective where Major General A. Adonyev serves the system of incentives for military servicemen is augmented by personal accounts in which the results of alert duty are taken into account as a running total. One can say that these are unique "labor books" for military service personnel. If they are excellent in their alert duty for 100, 150, 200 and 250 days (shifts) the military serviceman, in addition to measures envisioned by the disciplinary regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, are encouraged with a letter of gratitude from the collective, a personal banner, and a belt and a badge. This form of incentive contributes to activating the human factor in

fighting for increasing combat readiness and vigilance of alert forces and makes it possible to break up the circle of "leveling" which discourages excellence

At the same time, while evaluating what has been done according to principle and from a party standpoint, we also see a number of unsolved problems. This is shown by the unsatisfactory results of last year and cases of an unenthusiastic attitude toward their military duty and the low level of responsibility on the part of certain officials for this important area of military work. In a word, we must fight more resolutely against elements of indifference, complacency and carelessness. The role of personnel of the management level will increase immeasurably in this struggle. The restructuring is proceeding in this direction. We are reaching a point where an officer of the high staff is not an inspector-controller, but an organizer of a specific area of the life and activity of the units and subdivisions, whose main goal is to teach his subordinates and help them in word and deed.

[Question] A successful solution to the problems facing air defense forces is inseparably linked to the way the commanders and political agencies resolve problems of improving the social sphere. The daily life of the troops, their leisure, the quality of trade and medical support, strict observance of the principles of social justice in solving disciplinary, housing, personnel and many other problems—all this directly affects the attitude of people and this means their attitude toward their work. What kind of restructuring of the work in the social sphere is being conducted in the forces today?

[Answer] It seems that the social sphere of the life of the troops has for many years been pushed far into the background of the activity of commanders, political agencies, and staffs. And yet it is the most direct way to high-quality performance of combat tasks. For instance, can we really think that poor arrangement of the life of fliers, missile experts, and specialists of radio equipment troops does not influence their moods and their desire to perform their duties in an exemplary way? Can we really say that warmth and comfort in the billets, the quality of the food in the mess hall, the possibility of being entertained in a club, sitting in a library with a favorite book, listening to music, and watching movies do not add to the cheerfulness, energy and confidence of the personnel? The questions are far from idle. Of course the troops have all that is necessary for defending the country's air borders, there are highly qualified and ideologically tempered personnel, modern technical equipment and arms, and men who are ready to perform any order from the homeland. But we have fallen behind in the social sphere.

Just take the housing problem. Today many officers are forced to live with their families in dormitories, rent rooms from the population, or wait for years for housing when they transfer to a new post. The provision of apartments, the development of the sphere of services, work placement of wives of military servicemen, and

improvement of work with the children of military service personnel—these are the "sore sports" toward which the efforts of military councils, commanders and political agencies in the social area are now being directed.

It is not simple to overcome this segment of many years of stagnation, but positive changes have already been noted. The program for housing construction has been expanded significantly, and the most serious attention is being devoted to the quality of the facilities under construction. A policy has been adopted whereby in the military garrisons and villages we are constructing not only housing, but also other facilities for daily life: hospitals, dormitories, dining rooms, stores, schools, clubs, and therapeutic and preschool institutions. Concern for the remote subdivisions, the so-called "points," has come to the fore. Order is being imposed everywhere in the distribution of apartments. Extensive publicity has been provided in the majority of military collectives and social justice is being established. As it is being done, for example, in the collective where Col F. Frolov works. Not only here, but also in many other large and small units, lists of people waiting for apartments are no longer a deep, dark secret.

I can give as examples dozens of our garrisons where medical support and trade in consumer services for residents have been organized on the proper level, and this process will accelerate further.

Much is being done to improve the life of personnel in compulsory service: modern billets are being constructed, company management is being put into order, the organization of food services is improving, and clubs, soldiers' cafes, consumer service combines, and sports halls and areas are being constructed. They are searching for better ways of utilizing facilities for domestic and social purposes. For example, there are now garrison culture-sports complexes that expand the possibilities of utilizing the officers' facilities, enlisted men's clubs, libraries, and sports facilities according to a unified plan for all-round harmonious development of the individual's personality. Such a complex is operating successfully in the unit where political worker Col V. Morozov serves. As a creative person with initiative Vladimir Yefimovich is constantly concerned about more complete utilization of the possibilities of the complex that have been created. It is people like these who see their activity develop a social sphere. I wish to have as many of them as possible.

Recently many commanders, political agencies, and party organizations have begun to resolve the social and domestic problems of the garrisons more frequently and effectively in close contact with the local authorities. For example, in the garrison where political workers Major V. Ivanov works, the result of this interaction was the planned construction of a club, library, and enlisted men's cafe. And for the unit where Col A. Popov is a worker of the political division, the gorispolkom allotted

more than 100,000 rubles for the construction of housing for the officers. In the unit where Col A. Lavrinovich is a member of the party committee, the communists have become the initiators of the creation of park zones in the garrison and they have built the Lane of Glory.

[Question] According to tradition on the eve of "professional" holidays they usually celebrate those who have achieved the most significant results in military labor and in socialist competition. In the air defense forces there are quite a few specialists and military collectives who are used today as examples for others. Who can you note especially, Comrade Army General?

[Answer] Fifteen of the best of the best troops become the collective of the guard antiaircraft missile regiment which has won the Order of the Air Defense three times and is commanded by Guard Lt Col V. Soshko at a reception in the military council of the air defense forces. The reception was held right on the eve of the 1988 training year. There was something to report to the guard members who were initiators of a socialist competition in our branch of the armed forces in honor of the 70th anniversary of Great October. They honorably fulfilled their commitments. The personnel demonstrated high achievements in tactical training with combat fire. According to last year's results the regiment won the title of excellent regiment and was awarded the pendant of the USSR Ministry of Defense for courage and military valor. This year the collective of the regiment was again the initiator of competition in the air defense forces and took on increased socialist competitions and, judging from the first results, it is providing for unity of word and deed and proceeding to meet the 19th All-Union Party Conference with military successes. Among those who are in the vanguard of the socialist competition I wish to name the Airman A. Galaganov, Sgt A. Zulkhaydarov, Senior Ensign Ye. Zelenov, Lt A. Pogodayev, Capt V. Metveyev, and many others.

Hard winter training is in progress in the large and small units. The commanders, political agencies, and staff are striving to provide for quality and effectiveness of the combat and political training of all categories of personnel. Today it is impossible to stand in place or move forward slowly. The more so since we have not yet overcome stagnation in combat training everywhere, and the seasonal changes and piling up of work, especially before inspections and planned departures to the training sites, disturb the smooth training rhythm and cause serious harm.

It is quite predictable that success will come to those who have learned to work systematically, without interruptions, and with a high degree of responsibility. As always, the tone in military work is set by the communists. For example, in the party organization where the secretary is Major I. Sologub, all members of the CPSU are specialists with high class ratings and 25 percent of them are masters of combat qualifications. For many years in a row the regiment in which Major A. Kuznetsov serves

has worked at a level of high rating and has been given the title of excellent regiment. A high feeling of responsibility for performance of constitutional duty, a creative approach to solving problems that have been set, and organization in work are inherent in Lt Col A. Stetsenko. The unity command has performed military filing with an excellent evaluation for a number of years. Recently Lt Col A. Stetsenko was appointed to a high position. A good match for him is the commander of the advanced radio technical battalion, Lt Col N. Voznyuk. Modern aviation equipment has been mastered to perfection by

officers V. Bukhonov, V. Dobychin, V. Rybkin, V. Semenov, S. Shmakov and many other interceptor pilots. And we see the fact that the majority of our people are like this as a guarantee of successful fulfillment of the tasks for reliable protection of the air defense lines of our homeland.

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Reportage on Navy Day Festivities 31 Jul
PM0208095988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Aug 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed reports under general heading: "Flags Above the Roadsteads"]

[Text] The sky above Moscow was lit up by the fires of salvos to mark Navy Day on the evening of 31 July. Festive salvos were also fired in the capitals of union republics, hero cities, and fleets and flotillas.

Leningrad—Warships decorated with dress pennants were lined precisely along the Neva River. The legendary cruiser "Avrora," flagship of the celebration squadron, was also there, anchored off the Petrogradskaya Embankment. Admiral V. Samoylov, commander of the Leningrad Navy Base, toured the ships on parade in a launch and greeted their crews on the occasion.

The festivities were attended by Yu. Solovyev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom; Colonel General V. Yermakov, commander of the Leningrad Military District; and Lieutenant General A. Viktorov, chief of the Northwest Border District forces.

Vladivostok—By tradition, the Pacific Fleet ships parade took place in the Amur Bay roadstead. The parade was reviewed by Fleet Commander Admiral G. Khvatov, Army General P. Lushev, USSR first deputy defense minister, Colonel General M. Moiseyev, commander of the Far East Military District; and Admiral Kim Il-chol, commander of the DPRK Navy, accompanied him in the launch.

Severomorsk—The celebrations began with a review of warships on parade. The parade was reviewed by Vice Admiral F. Gromov, commander of the Northern Fleet.

The festivities were attended by V. Putsyn, first secretary of the Murmansk CPSU Obkom, and representatives of party and soviet organs.

Sevastopol—Citizens and guests of the hero city assembled in their thousands along the Sevastopol Bay Quay. The parade was reviewed by Admiral M. Khronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

Taking part in the festivities were Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, and A. Girenko, first secretary of the Crimean Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom.

Baltiysk—Admiral V. Ivanov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, reviewed a parade of warships from a launch and congratulated the seamen on the occasion. The ships then performed combat exercises.

D. Romanin, first secretary of the Kaliningrad CPSU Obkom, and party and soviet officials were at the visitors' stand.

Vice Admiral Panin on Navy Political Work
PM0408140388 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 88 p 2

[Correspondent D. Mysyakov interview with Vice Admiral V.I. Panin, member of the Military Council and chief of the USSR Navy Political Directorate, under the rubric "Today is USSR Navy Day": "Duty Location—the Ocean"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Mysyakov] If you have no objections, we will begin with political work in the Navy. What kind of person, in your view, should a political worker be? What is primarily required of him?

[Panin] Political work is complex work with people. Being a deputy commander in charge of political affairs has never been easy, and today it is even less so. Literally just a few years ago hardly anyone would have imagined he would have to work under completely new social conditions. It seems we had ready answers "packaged" into strict formulas to many difficult questions. The uniformity of opinions and appraisals presented by various authorities and the mass media simplified the position of the political worker and, to a certain degree, eroded his individuality. The present ferment of discussion and diversity and freshness of ideas is the element of real political fighters and intelligent—I would say keen-witted—polemicists. The pluralism of opinions can only be welcomed, but how difficult it is for the young person to formulate and hold onto his own opinion in this kind of atmosphere. Today you can no longer hide behind generalities. The political worker has to get right to the heart of every phenomenon, every fact. There is a danger that he will become confused and lose his way. There is only one solution to this—Marxist-Leninist methodology, which the political worker must master to perfection and arm others with. He must also have an enormous love for people so that their joys and concerns really touch his heart. I would compare a deputy commander in charge of political affairs to a doctor. You know, at one time in Russia there were some remarkable local doctors who treated all their patients as if they were relatives and who lived their patients' pain and suffering with them. That is the kind of "home doctor" the good political worker is becoming for his subordinates.

[Mysyakov] But all this is the ideal, so to speak. What is the real situation? Are you satisfied with the performance of young political workers?

[Panin] On the whole, yes. Some quite good officers are coming out of the Kiev Higher Naval Political School. They know what they are doing and have the desire to work. But what worries me is this: Many of those who are

perfectly confident in front of a large audience quite often become flustered when they simply have to talk candidly to a sailor on a one-to-one basis.

[Mysyakov] My next question will probably seem rather strange, but I shall ask it anyway. Are there bureaucrats in the Navy?

[Panin] There are still too many bureaucrats everywhere. You cannot separate the Armed Forces from society as a whole and see them as some isolated sphere. We have the same problems and the same concerns. I think that the resolution "On Combating Bureaucracy" adopted by the 19th all-union party conference is no less relevant to the Navy than to any other department.

[Mysyakov] I would be interested to know how Navy personnel reacted to the discussions at the conference and to its decisions?

[Panin] I can say with certainty that the fleet followed the conference work with the greatest attention. I reached this opinion following a recent meeting with seamen in the north. In the course of a single conversation I was asked more than 70 questions in my capacity as a delegate. And none of these questions was "formal." To tell the truth, I had not really been expecting this kind of activity, but I was very gratified by it. I had a frank, honest discussion with the seamen for about 3 hours. One of the subjects, incidentally, was bureaucracy.

[Mysyakov] The bureaucrat, as you well know, recognizes only one method of leadership—the high-handed, administrative style. The rejection of this method is now a fact of our life. However, as you know, this has always been the way with the military: Someone gives the orders and someone else obeys....

[Panin] And so it will continue. The principle of one-man command operates in armies all over the world and no one intends to reject it now. There is simply no other principle of troop control. But I would not attempt to set one-man command in opposition to the process of democratization which is now gathering momentum in the Armed Forces. When making a decision, the commander relies on the collective intellect. We do not have and cannot have anyone with unlimited power. Of course, in combat conditions, situations are likely to arise where everything will depend on the decision of one person empowered to make that decision. It goes without saying that this is an enormous responsibility. But combat management is one thing and everyday Army and Navy life in all its diversity is another—the social side in particular. Public opinion and glasnost are the real forces which can and must protect military collectives against bureaucracy and the arbitrary will of officials. [passage omitted]

[Mysyakov] Vasily Ivanovich, the latest Army and Navy draft took place recently. What can you say about the new recruits?

[Panin] I often hear the complaint that people come to us uneducated and morally lacking. Yes, we do have people who, before being drafted, acquired a criminal record or became too fond of alcohol or drugs. But it is all too easy to put the blame on schools, vocational and technical schools, and worthless predraft training. It is far more difficult to make these people—these "defectives"—into real men and defenders of the motherland. There is no reason to rail endlessly at draftees whenever it suits you. They are this, they are that.... It simply is not true! They are normal young men—intelligent, competent. Perhaps some of them do not immediately see themselves as military men and find it difficult to be subordinate to someone else's will and orders. But this just means that we must help them from the very start and give them support.

[Mysyakov] But sometimes this "help" takes very peculiar, even ugly forms. Of all the difficulties they experience in service, many young seamen put so-called "non-regulation relations" at the top of the list.

[Panin] This term has been invented simply in order to conceal what is really happening. I have a book here on the shelf—Internal Service Regulations. They regulate relations between servicemen. If you carefully read the first chapter you will see that "nonregulation" signifies a breach of military ethics and the rules of subordination in relations between senior personnel and their juniors. But the humiliation of new recruits is something quite different. Let us call a spade a spade: Hooliganism is hooliganism and crime is crime. Then a great deal will fall into place. It becomes clear, for example, that the same incidents happen in the Army and Navy as in ordinary civilian life. People are just used to regarding these incidents as something out of the ordinary simply because it is the Army or Navy, you see. This is wrong. Everyone is equal in the eyes of the law whether they have shoulder bars or not.

I have no intention of claiming that the Navy is now free of "bullying." This miserable, corrupt tradition is still with us. An unhealthy atmosphere has taken shape in some naval collectives. So what should we do? The answer is obvious: We must fight it. But the way we choose to do this is very important. Intimidating orders? We have tried this and it has not helped very much. I, for one, am sure that not a great deal will be achieved with bans and threats. [passage omitted]

[Mysyakov] Reading letters from seamen, you can conclude that Komsomol organizations are not very actively involved in the fight against "bullying." Among all the reasons given for their "feebleness" you often hear one in particular: As a rule, the position of secretary on board ship is held by a young graduate from political school. Formal elections are held. One candidate is nominated on the recommendation of political bodies. Through force of habit everyone votes "for." And what can you

do? You cannot leave the lieutenant without a job. But often he hardly knows the crew and no one knows him either. What kind of leader of young people is this?

[Panin] I cannot say you are wrong on this, unfortunately. We often still have "performances" instead of real elections. But I think we have found the solution to this. Why should this lieutenant definitely become secretary of the Komsomol organization? Let him work as an instructor, for example; his knowledge will be useful. Then, after a year, for example, he could offer himself as a candidate for the position of secretary. But there must definitely be other candidates as well. If he is elected that is all well and good, if not—that's life.

But generally we set great store by the Komsomol. These are young times we live in.

Television Coverage of Chernavin Navy Day Speech

LD3107165388 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1120 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Speech by Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, USSR deputy defense minister, Naval commander in chief, and Hero of the Soviet Union, on 31 July on the occasion of Navy Day; place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] Dear comrades: In marking today, a great festive occasion for the Soviet people—Navy Day—I want to note that we are marking this holiday in a special atmosphere in the country, in an atmosphere that is characterized by the powerful effect on all aspects of our life of the recently held 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and its decisions. These decisions inspire the occasion itself, Navy Day, and all sailors with particular pride for our country, our party, our people, and for the fact that we are all not only witnesses to, but also active, direct participants in the great achievements occurring in our country today.

Our country, as is known, is not only a great continental but it is also an equally great maritime power. Today we are rightly proud of the fact that revolutionary sailors were in the vanguard of the active participants in the Great October Socialist Revolution; their sons and grandsons were heroic defenders of the freedom and independence of our great native land in the difficult fiery years of the war, and are reliable defenders of maritime borders in peacetime.

In honoring our sailors today, we ought also to say kind words to our scientists, engineers, designers, and workers, all those who create with their minds and hands the most up to date ships and combat hardware that is today used to equip our naval fleet.

Today our sailors are accomplishing important tasks in the expanses of the world's oceans relating to ensuring the security of our homeland, the security of our allies and countries with which we have friendly relations, and

strengthening friendship between peoples. They are constantly at a high level of readiness to cut short any aggression at sea. Sailors must accomplish these tasks in difficult conditions, in any even the most unfavorable weather. The indicator of the political barometer on many seas and oceans invariably points to stormy weather.

What this leads to is borne out both by the situation in the Mediterranean and the situation in the Persian Gulf, where recently through the fault of the U.S. naval forces tragedy struck in the destruction of an Iranian passenger plane on board which 298 people died. It is also not calm in other regions of the world's oceans where our Soviet sailors are performing their combat tour of duty today.

It was stressed at the party conference that building defense should be determined primarily by qualitative parameters, both in hardware and personnel. I can say today with pride and a sense of responsibility that the Navy's personnel is our main reserve in enhancing combat power and combat readiness. Sailors on long sea voyages, in the depths of the ocean, and in difficult flights over boundless waters constantly display skill, and a high level of training, courage, and heroism at times too.

For example, the crews of missile-carrying cruisers "Groznyy" and "Varyag," of the large antisubmarine ship "Ochakov," of the atomic submarine "Leninskiy Komsomol," of the frigate "Bezzavetnyy," and of many other ships in our fleet are performing their tasks worthily in the seas and oceans. Model examples of martial labor are being set by naval airmen and marine infantrymen, by our military builders and by all categories of personnel in our Naval Fleet.

At the same time, we have a considerable amount of unsolved problems, difficulties, and shortcomings, and sometimes simply of poor quality in work and discipline. In short, we are all faced with a great deal of persistent work in fulfilling the conference's mandate concerning the need to adopt, for the most part, qualitative criteria in assessing the training of naval forces, and with adding considerably to our work—each of us and all together.

The military threat from imperialism still remains today. We must by no means forget this if we really wish to draw the correct conclusions from our history. All the more concern is caused by the pacifist moods which sometimes occur, by failings in the military-patriotic education of young people, and by shortcomings in work concerning their physical state and the preparation of young people for service in the Army and the fleet. This is impermissible. Historical experience teaches us that you must not trifle with such matters; we must do everything necessary to eliminate such shortcomings from our work. This is our duty, to the fallen and to the living, to the present and to the future.

Dear comrades, allow me to cordially congratulate the sailors, their families, kith and kin, and all Soviet people on the nationwide holiday of Soviet Navy Day, and to wish all of you, dear comrades, prosperity and good future, happiness and great success in life and labor for the good of our great motherland. Thank you for your attention.

Admiral Discusses Navy Role, Activities
PM0308153388 Moscow TRUD in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 3

[Interview with Admiral K. Makarov, chief of the Navy Main Staff, by unnamed TRUD correspondent: "Flying the Motherland's Ensign. 31 July Is Soviet Navy Day"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] The USSR is a great seagoing power with its own state interests in different oceans of the world. How does the Soviet Navy protect these interests?

[Makarov] You know that there are people in the West who seriously claim that the Soviet Union has no need for a powerful fleet because, according to them, it is a continental power. The Soviets, they say, maintain such a fleet for just one purpose—an aggressive purpose, of course. No matter how paradoxical it may sound, this is actually one of the arguments they use to prove the aggressiveness of our country, whose territory is, by the way, washed by 12 seas and 3 oceans and whose sea borders stretch over 47,000 km.

About "aggressiveness," since we are on the subject: I must say that our fleet, heir of glorious combat traditions, has never participated in aggressive actions. Our ships which now sail the world ocean threaten no one. They are there for a single purpose: to protect the motherland from the seas. It is well known that at present, in terms of its scale and tasks, the operational and combat training of naval forces of the United States and its allies goes beyond the framework of rehearsing defensive actions. This forces us to display vigilance and to maintain the Navy in a state of readiness to repulse aggression.

Our fleet also plays an important role in implementing the Soviet state's foreign policy actions aimed at achieving measures of trust and easing international tension. Moreover, it is important to stress that our Navy's entire activity in the world's oceans is based on the principles of the UN Charter and on strict and precise observance of current norms of international laws of the sea.

Other tasks could emerge, of course. For example, protection of Soviet fishing vessels in fishing areas or protection of our civilian shipping in international sea lanes such as, for instance, the Persian Gulf. As a matter of fact the number of Soviet ships, on the one hand, and ships belonging to the United States and its allies, on the other, bears no comparison in that region, and this

reflects with utmost clarity the objectives pursued by the USSR and the United States there. The protection of our ships is undertaken, as a rule, by just a few ships, while the United States, having proclaimed the Persian Gulf a zone of its "vital interests" and pursuing far-reaching political goals there, has concentrated major carrier groups and operational missile task forces in the region.

[Correspondent] What is our fleet's structure? What could you say about our submarine forces?

[Makarov] The Soviet Navy is one branch of the USSR Armed Forces. Its basis is provided by nuclear submarines and high-mobility long-range naval aviation. Its composition also includes nuclear or conventionally powered surface ships of different classes armed with missile weapons, including aircraft-carrying ships, coastal missile artillery forces, and marine units.

People are, of course, the core of this combat system. While on the subject of the fleet's development, our main concern is to select, educate, and train cadres who are devoted to the people, highly competent, and capable of working in the spirit of restructuring and renewal. Our fleet's development is based on the principles of defensive sufficiency. We are not striving to achieve military superiority at sea, but neither can we ignore the real situation developing in different parts of the ocean.

Finally, about the notorious "aggressive orientation" of our submarine forces: This impression of them is forced on the public in Western countries by certain circles interested in reviving the "enemy image" which they have created and which is now melting away, and who are interested in discrediting the peace-loving orientation of the USSR foreign policy. Western figures making such statements deliberately omit the obvious fact that our submarine forces are a counterweight to the missile-carrying nuclear fleet of the United States and other NATO bloc member countries. It would not go amiss to recall the NATO bloc's considerable superiority over the Warsaw Pact Organization—almost threefold in major surface ships, two and a half-fold in naval aircraft, and twofold in total tonnage of naval ships. It must also be borne in mind that we lack powerful warships like aircraft carriers and battleships with long-range cruise missiles, designed also to strike against coastal targets.

[Correspondent] There has been a lot of talk recently about confidence-building measures in the naval sphere. In particular, this was discussed during the recent Soviet-U.S. summit talks. Questions of reducing the numbers of sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's] are also being discussed. We would like to know your opinion, Comrade Admiral.

[Makarov] The Soviet Union's initiatives in this regard were outlined by M.S. Gorbachev in his speeches in Vladivostok, Delhi, Murmansk, and Belgrade and in E.A. Shevardnadze's speech at the UN General Assembly third special session. These initiatives constitute a

targeted comprehensive program of a global nature, taking into account the specific nature of particular regions. Even though certain steps have been taken along the path of implementing these measures, many obstacles still remain.

One of the fundamental questions is the limitation of SLCM's. This is a serious obstacle on the road toward an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. It must be borne in mind that SLCM's are extremely dangerous arms whose proliferation in the world's oceans clearly destabilizes the strategic situation as a whole and increases the risk of an armed conflict being unleashed.

The achievement of accord on cruise missiles is prevented primarily by the stance of the United States, which, even though it does not deny in principle the need to limit SLCM's, is doing nothing practical in this sphere, citing the ineffectiveness of the monitoring system. We, on the other hand, believe that monitoring of SLCM's is possible. In order to monitor them, it is necessary to set up observation posts all along the missile's route from the time it leaves the manufacturing plant to its installation on a ship, including the point where combat charges are fitted. It would also be reasonable to set limitations on the number and type of warships on which they can be sited. Of course, provision must be made for the possibility of on-site inspection of missile installations on demand at any time. But the U.S. side rejects all these proposals.

For some reason the United States does not class SLCM's as strategic weapons and is using this as a pretext for excluding them from discussion on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. This cannot be accepted since long-range nuclear cruise missiles (with a yield of 200-250 kilotons and a range of 2,600 km) can reach the territory of the USSR from virtually all sea and ocean theaters. In short, SLCM's constitute a barrier which must be overcome in order to achieve a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

[Correspondent] There has always been an aura of romanticism surrounding service in the fleet. How is today's generation of Soviet seamen coping with the ocean vigil?

[Makarov] I for one believe that it is lovers of the sea who serve in the fleet. What else could attract seamen to this service, which is hard and at times even dangerous? Months-long cruises in distant latitudes from the north to the south, often without any port calls to replenish stores, and for submariners even without surfacing. Long separations from families, a work day which stretches far beyond the conventional 8 hours... And of course, the supreme responsibility to the fatherland. And if you think of the weapons that ship commanders have to deal

with, and their responsibility also to the world community. After all, a ship in the ocean is part of our country's inviolable territory and its commander is someone who has the right to make decisions on behalf of the state.

Let me return to the Persian Gulf. The ships that are there perform their tasks in conditions of the "tanker war," with combat operations by the combatant states and constant threat of mines, with all ensuing consequences. Add to this the merciless heat, with temperatures reaching 60 degrees at some combat stations, and you will get some impression of the conditions in which our seamen operate.

Briefly speaking, today's generation of Soviet seamen fittingly continues the traditions of frontline fighters. It is no accident that, in the postwar years alone, hundreds of the Navy's seamen have been awarded USSR orders and medals and more than 50 have become Heroes of the Soviet Union. Take for example the recent feat by sailor Sergey Preminin. At a crucial moment for the ship, and for the sake of performing the combat task, for the sake of saving people, he gave his life to do what was required of him—he shut down a submarine's reactor. You must agree that this is a feat to match the greatest feats of the Great Patriotic War, like that of Private Aleksandr Matrosov, for example...

Article Views Life at Navy Command Post
PM0608150088 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Jul 88 Second Edition p 2

[Special correspondent A. Gorokhov report from the Central Command Station under the rubric "Today Is USSR Navy Day": "Ocean Watch"]

[Text] The interior of this hall, the size of two volleyball courts and with no "fighting cocks" on the walls, as its occupants say, that is, with no superfluous inspiring—or rather, distracting—pictures, contains nothing to indicate what department it belongs to. Only a large free-standing globe suggests that planetary matters are controlled here.

The desks of the operating officers, several men at each of them. VDT's, two large indicator boards, telephones, safes. One of them is clearly the one that must be opened in extraordinary circumstances. Which one? I keep the question to myself—guests are extremely rare here, especially journalists, and since they have let me in, I had better keep quiet and not interrupt people's work.

An indicator board lights up: the state of affairs in the fleets at this morning hour. No, it is not the weather that is indicated, but the number of NATO and other submarines deployed in the positional areas. I wonder, how many?... But no! I immediately forget the number, which, in some headquarters across the ocean, perhaps in a hall just like this one, they could compare with the real figure and immediately calculate the effectiveness of Soviet means of detection. It is no accident that the

military-technical rivalry that the world community cannot yet manage to "confine" within a verifiable treaty framework is called, with regard to submarine building, the "silent war," in which designers, staffs, and commanding officers excel. The logic of the development of technology and armaments—in general the logic of the absurd, a logic that leads the world to an impasse.

They have managed to make some progress and take the first step along the path to a nuclear-free world in the sphere of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (tomorrow, incidentally, the implementation of the historic Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles begins in Kazakhstan). But naval armaments are still a "blank spot" in the talks process, to this day not even "colored in" with confidence-building measures, something that the Soviet Union calls for persistently and consistently.

Operational information from all over the planet, or rather, from every corner of the world's oceans where Soviet ships sail, converges here, in this hall, the Soviet Navy's unique "bridge." It does not happen the same way every time, but sometimes a need arises not only for practical advice for the commanding officer of a particular "unit," but also for "first aid." In the event of a serious emergency, an "irregular situation," experts come to the Central Command station and together, terribly pressed for time, work out proposals for the adoption of decisions that hundreds of lives depend on.

This happened, for instance, in October 1986, when fire broke out in one compartment of a nuclear submarine of ours carrying ballistic missiles, when it was 1,000 km northeast of the islands of Bermuda. For 3 days (it is easy to say that: "3 days") the crews of the submarine and the Soviet ships that arrived on the scene fought for the submarine's life, and in the end for the crew's life. For 3 days! They managed to shut down the reactor and exclude the possibility of a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination, but the submarine, alas, they could not save, and the village of Skornyakovo, in the Vologda region, received the bitter news of the death of seaman Sergey Preminin...

Many of those working at the operators' desks today were on duty on the day the Soviet tanker "Marshal Chuykov" was blown up by a mine in the Persian Gulf. It was on that very day that the maritime minesweeper "Kurskiy Komsomolets" joined the detachment of our ships in the Indian Ocean. Peacetime, supposedly, but for the crew of the minesweeper, the 14,000 miles it traveled in the Gulf could hardly be called peaceful. The seamen worked with the damaged "Chuykov," soon were told about the tragedy to the American frigate "Stark," then witnessed the shelling of a Pakistani tanker and were themselves subjected to a training attack by 12 fast Iranian launches (good "training," you'll agree). Captain 3d Class A. Golodov (commander of the minesweeper) was awarded an order for his combat service in the Persian Gulf.

March 1986: gross violation of the USSR state border by the U.S. cruiser "Yorktown" and destroyer "Caron" south of the Crimean peninsula. Late September: provocative entry into the Sea of Okhotsk by four U.S. Navy ships, the group consisting of the flagship battleship "New Jersey," two cruisers, and a destroyer, the purpose being "to show the flag off the shores of the Soviet Union." May 1987: gross violation by the U.S. Navy nuclear missile cruiser "Arkansas" of the USSR state border in the Avachinskaya Straits region, Kamchatka. February 1988: another violation of our border near the Crimea by the cruiser "Yorktown" and the destroyer "Caron" (old friends!)...

I am not recalling these facts to make an interesting story. The point is this: Whether we like it or not (and of course, we don't!), the risk of military confrontation at sea is very great. Now, today! If naval confrontation were merely preserved, perhaps at a high, dangerous level, but at least at a stable level! Alas, my interlocutors noted that confrontation is being stepped up. And even more interestingly: Whatever the Soviet Union and its friends do, such as reducing the scale of naval operations (not just in theory, but in practice), it always receives the same kind of judgment, along the lines of "the Soviets' perfidious tricks."

Reports come in (there is constant communication with all ships). I read some of them:

—in the Persian Gulf, the minesweeper "Rulevoy" has begun to escort the tanker "Groznyy" and the diesel ship "Znamya Oktyabrya" to the exit from the Gulf;

—the aircraft-carrier "Baku" has refueled from the "Berezina" (Mediterranean);

—the minesweepers "Svyazist" and "Motorist" have replenished their stocks of fuel, water, and fresh vegetables purchased in the Canary Islands from the tanker "Oyar Vatsiyetis" (Central Atlantic);

—the large antisubmarine ship "Marshal Shaposhnikov" picked up people (34 of them) from capsized launches and, changing course, took them to the material and technical supply station at Camranh (South China Sea);

—the truck battalion of the Black Sea Fleet has left for the harvest;

—preparations for the festive parade are completed in all fleets....

The watch draws to an end. The ritual of the change of shift is worked out in every detail, down to the fact that at the end of the morning report to the leadership of the Main Staff there is a brief review of the central newspapers, beginning with PRAVDA.

Many commanding officers of ships from various fleets told me about their collaboration with the Central Command station, speaking of it with gratitude. In view of the fact that the Central Command station is the top of a kind of pyramid of fleet command stations, one can conclude that the people working here are professionals of a high standard who have exchanged the captain's bridge (as a rule) for the operator's computer.

So I listen to the dispatches and reports, look at the indicator boards, and cannot help thinking about what is behind these figures. People at NATO and Warsaw Pact headquarters know very well who has how many armed forces and armaments. We calculate that the forces are approximately equal.

(True, that is overall. There are a number of imbalances and asymmetries, for instance, in the Pacific. There, for the information of readers, the Americans have 8 times more multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles than we do, 3 times more combat aircraft, 10 times more carrier-borne aircraft, 3 times more combat ships, 27 (!) times more marines.... The number of exercises we held in this theater last year remained at the 1986 level. The intensity of U.S. Navy exercises and maneuvers here has increased, and, moreover, with the broad involvement of the Japanese and South Korean Navies so that they themselves could concentrate on the Okhotsk and Kamchatka salients and blockade the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan. In the U.S. 7th Fleet they are building up the number of ships carrying Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles—their range is 2,500 km. At the same time there is no Soviet warship close to the Pacific coast of the United States.)

The passage in brackets is incidental. But let us ask ourselves: Is there a threat of a surprise attack from the sea, particularly in the Pacific Ocean, where the United States has, in addition to its waterborne and airborne systems, another 300 military facilities on land? There is a threat, whatever they may say. The purpose of our Pacific Fleet, on the basis of defensive doctrine, is to remove or at least reduce that threat.

When I talked with the "duty admiral" (that is still what they call the post of duty officer for the USSR Navy), Rear Admiral A. Smolin, I formed a better idea of how important it is to convey promptly and accurately the

information received at the Central Command station, how seriously it influences subsequent analysis and the decisions made by the naval leadership.

"How did the duty shift go?" My question was repeated by Aleksandr Matveyevich, who graduated with distinction from the Lenin Komsomol Submarine Navigation School 33 years ago and served "unreprimanded" for 10 years on the Pacific Fleet, including 4 years as a submarine commander. "Calmly on the whole, which is admittedly rare. Thank heavens when nothing happens! Yes, the situation has relaxed a great deal recently, it has become somehow simpler. But our opponents have not given up their strategy of 'forward sea borders.' Their strategy is aggressive: constant exercises on our flanks, constant presence close to our shores, constant rehearsals of first-strike operations, and so forth. What am I driving at? That now more than ever before, the role of operational staffs has increased to one of state importance. Today a struggle of intellects, if you like, is taking place, concealed from casual eyes..."

I think the "duty admiral's" subordinates with whom I became acquainted, alas all too briefly, have tremendous support in their personal experience as commanding officers.

Captain 1st Class V. Malyarov, who served in the North, the Baltic, and the Black Sea and for 16 years on the Pacific Fleet, 14 of them as commanding officer ("When I receive a report, I always try to put myself in the place of the man who found himself in a difficult situation"). Captain 2d Class V. Peregudov, his 17 years' service—all of it in the Northern Fleet—on one large antisubmarine ship, came here in January from the post of commanding officer ("You never forget for a moment that you were a commanding officer too, that our objective is at all costs to ensure that the ship fulfills the task set"). Captain 2d Class E. Osadchiy—all his service in the Black Sea, 7 years as a commanding officer, the last 3 years at the Central Command station ("The Navy is resolving important tasks, and the attitude must be appropriate to the task").

...The posting is completed. The new shift begins. A. Smolin reports to the Central Command station chief:

"Operational watch for the Navy handed over!..."

Restructuring in DOSAAF Complicated by New Economic Mechanism

18010385b Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 88 p 7

[Article by V. Zhmurko, chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk DOSAAF obkom: "What Shall We Create Instead?"]

[Text] The 10th DOSAAF Congress is one more bright page in the glorious history of the defense society. The delegates held a frank discussion about shortcomings, stagnant manifestations in the training of youth for military service, and the development of technical and military-related types of sports. The reasons that were mentioned without reservation are: the indifference of many DOSAAF committees, bureaucratism, and lack of interest in assigned work.

We will say that is what it was like yesterday. But what awaits us tomorrow? In discarding the negative, what shall we create in its stead?

The congress worked out and approved a multifaceted program of restructuring that is based on progressive experience, and it outlined tasks that are really directed at the future. And now the main thing is to move from words into action, and to get on with putting plans into practice without waivering. Members of the presidium of the DOSAAF obkom talked about this at a meeting which considered the materials of the congress and the outlined new plans of our work.

But it is known: something new does not start from nothing. And therefore it is useful to look back. Does the oblast defense organization have the potential to accomplish a breakthrough to an appreciable achievement in large-scale military-patriotic, sports and training work? Yes, it has.

First of all there are our cadres. For it is only people, it was noted in delegate speeches at the 10th DOSAAF Congress, who are ideologically convinced and who thoroughly know the job they are responsible for, who can resolve great and complex questions that are posed by the times.

With the help of party and soviet organs we were able to select hard-working comrades to DOSAAF committees whose attention is centered on eliminating shortcomings and on a phased resolution of future problems. On the oblast committee, for example, communists comprise 60 percent of the staff, many members have a higher and secondary education, and more than a half have worked 5 and more years. It is not necessary to say that such people are capable of important and complex tasks.

The department of mass organizational work, managed by S. Korol, is functioning creatively. Measures conducted by it are addressed mostly to young people who are heading for the army tomorrow. The department

prepared the TV program series "Poverka" ["Roll Call"] jointly with the Komsomol obkom and the oblast military commissariat. It was viewed with great interest by the city and the oblast. In five programs the creators tried to show what kinds of abilities and skills draftees acquired in DOSAAF training classrooms and on sports fields. This includes weapons firing, skill with a motorcycle and driving a motor car. Reports were filed from laboratories and school auditoriums, clubs and motor vehicle testing grounds [s avto i motodromov]. In that way, there was a simultaneous popularization of technical and militarily applicable types of sports, and the activity of the defense society was explained.

I will note that the necessity for this kind of propaganda was talked about from the podium of the 10th DOSAAF Congress. We have a lot to demonstrate. For example, the Krivoy Rog Automotive School No 1 (Chief Ye. Podvoyskiy), by virtue of the results of the just-completed training year, was awarded the Outstanding Red Banner of the Red Banner Kiev Military District. The collective of the Dnepropetrovsk automotive school is also working well. By a resolution of the oblispolkom and the oblast soviet of trade unions it was awarded the title "Enterprise of High Standards and Exemplary Production Conditions."

It was said at the congress that creativity and initiative in the preparation and conduct of large-scale defense work was the decisive factor in the achievement of success in any sphere. These qualities are especially necessary to its immediate organizers—the primary DOSAAF organizations and the rayon committees of the defense society. It is more apparent to them what forms and methods have to be selected to achieve one or another result.

For example, workers of the Zhovtnevoye organization of the defense society set the goal of enlivening mass sports work in institutes. They did not achieve much at first. The sections and clubs were weak and did not attract students. "If you would put motorcycles, motorcars and radios at our disposal, then we would have a way of applying our strengths," said the young people. But where does one get the means to accomplish the desirable? They found a way out: they decided to create an inter-VUZ STK [possibly inter-school sports and training club], to combine the resources of several organizations and in this way create a central base for the development of training and sports work. And that is what they did. Now hundreds of students are involved with the inter-VUZ STK—enthusiasts of technical and militarily applicable types of sports [rifle firing, gliding, parachuting, driving, flying, judo, swimming etc]. Rifle, radio and motor vehicle testing ground sections are active in the STK.

And here is another example. A. Dubenetskiy, USSR Master of Sports, organized an model aircraft club in the village of Zhovtnevoye of the Sofievskiy Rayon. He was able to attract many schoolboys, and in time the section grew into an model aircraft laboratory, and its work was

talked about in the rayon and in the oblast. And now a modern building, erected by builders of the city of Krivoy Rog with the cooperation of B. Bogatyr, secretary of the party gorkom, has been made available to the young people. Members of the village aircraft laboratory established 15 world and 30 all-union records in the aircraft modeling sport.

Of course, as in other organizations of the defense society, we have problems and unresolved questions. I am making a judgment in this instance in light of the speeches at the congress. Actually, a well-known contradiction has set in between the number of DOSAAF members and the real possibility of getting them involved in work. This contradiction can be eliminated in two ways. The most reliable is to exclude so-called dead weight from DOSAAF membership. But in such a case an adjustment also has to be made in the plan for the collection of membership dues to make up for the reduction in membership. Higher authorities allow the former, but they prohibit the latter. One asks, where is the logic? In our opinion, we are dealing with a typical situation where local calculations are not taken into account and the principle of administration by mere injunction is operative.

The development of large-scale defense work in the primary organizations is hindered by the high prices of equipment and property issued by DOSAAF production enterprises. And their variety is not great enough to satisfy all clubs and sections in which the young people work.

Under the new conditions of economic management it has become more difficult to free sportsmen for education and training assemblies and for various competitions. The maximum payment of wages [limit] is insignificant. So, what happens is that the enterprise does not give a sportsman a leave of absence, and the DOSAAF committee does not have anything to pay him with. How could the situation that has developed not further complicate the already difficult questions of educating the youth?

A complicated knot has also been tied in the matter of training of youth for service in the army and the navy. Many departments are involved, which leads to a dissipation of resources. Would it not be better to maintain a staff of military instructors in DOSAAF rather than in the Ministry of Education system? In such a case, more qualified management of basic military training will be ensured. Or, let us say, why train technical specialists in the SPTU [vocational training school] for the Armed Forces when the strong DOSAAF training base is not functioning full-time?

A lot was said about all of these problems at the congress. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has to present them more boldly to the appropriate public and state organs. The time in which we live demands this—a time of acceleration and self-dependency.

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**Simonov's Letter From Archives on Stalin,
Repression of Military**

*18010398b Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 May 88 p 5*

[Excerpts from archive of K. Simonov; first four paragraphs PRAVDA introduction; complete text of relevant letter is translated]

[Excerpts] "...A human being who seriously deserves the name, he lives after the war with the feeling that he has undergone an operation on his heart," Konstantin Simonov noted once. He himself lived with this same feeling up until the very last day of his life. The war for him was a spiritual earthquake which determined much in his personality and in his destiny.

Simonov was not only a faithful chronicler of the great national war, but also a serious and thorough investigator of it. When it pertained to the war, for him there was nothing unessential or insignificant—everything was important. He worked on the history of operations—those to which he was an eye witness and those in which he had not participated personally. He was also interested in combat activities as they appeared at various levels of the military hierarchy—from the rank-and-file to the commanders of armies and navies—and among various kinds of troops. And Stalin's responsibility for the severe defeats we suffered and for the fact that the Germans managed to reach Moscow and Stalingrad, Leningrad and the Caucasus. And the moral problems generated by the constant danger of death. And the self-sacrificing—to the point of exhaustion—work in the rear. And the terrible fate of our military prisoners, their resistance in the fascist prison camps, and the atmosphere of suspicion that surrounded him during the postwar years. And the searches continuing over so many years for friends and relatives who have disappeared without a trace. And the attitude toward disabled veterans and participants in the war. And the development of the literature about the war (artistic, documentary, memoirs, historical) as well as the movies and television programs, and the problems and difficulties that have appeared here. And the memory of the threatening time on the part of those who did not experience it, the young people. Far from everything has been named here; it is impossible to list it all. Even those few of Simonov's letters that are being published today show the unusually broad range of his interests.

Simonov's judgments about the war were penetrating, weighed, and substantiated. It is indicative that people paid attention to them and that they carried authority for eminent military leaders as well. We know the respect for Simonov that was felt on the part of G. K. Zhukov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, I. S. Konev, I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. S. Isakov, I. Ye. Petrov, L. I. Batov, and A. V. Gorbатов. A. M. Vasilevskiy once called Simonov the national writer of the USSR, having in mind not a nonexistent title but the popular view of the war that was inherent in the writer. "It is very important to us," he wrote to the

author of "Living and Dead" and "Various Days of the War"—"also that all of your nationally known and unreservedly loved creative works pertaining to almost all the important events of the war are conveyed to the reader as fundamentally as possible, and the main thing—with absolute truthfulness and substantiation, without any attempts to satisfy all kinds of trends of postwar years and the present day which sometimes depart from the strict truth of history, which many of our writers, and especially our brothers the memoir writers, for various reasons are so willing to do.

Simonov left the broadest epistolary legacy. The 12th volume of his collection of essays devoted entirely to letters, which culminates this legacy, just came out. The publishing house Sovetskiy Pisatel is preparing an equally large book of letters devoted to one subject—the war and military literature (three-fourths of the letters included in it were not included in the collection of essays). The letters published here were taken from this book. They are printed from copies found in K. M. Simonov's archive, which is stored with his family.

D. D. Delov

Gulripshi, 29 June 1964

Dear Dmitriy Dmitriyevich, I received your letter and consider it necessary to answer the question you asked.

I think that the arguments about Stalin's personality and his role in the history of our society are predictable. They will continue in the future. In any case until the entire truth has been learned and told, the whole truth about all aspects of Stalin's activity during all periods of his life.

I think that our attitude toward Stalin during past years, including the war years, and our admiration for him during the war years—and this admiration was probably approximately the same for you, for the chief of your political department, Col Ratnik, and for me—this admiration in this past does not give us the right not to consider what we know now, not to take the facts into account. Yes, now I would prefer to think that I do not have, for instance, those verses which began with the words: "Comrade Stalin, do you hear us?" But these verses were written in 1941, and I am not embarrassed about the fact that they were written then because they express what I felt and thought at the time; they express my hope and belief in Stalin. I felt these feelings at the time and therefore I wrote them. But, on the other hand, it is a fact that I wrote such verses at that time, not knowing what I know now, not having the slightest idea of extent of Stalin's crimes against the party and the army, the entire extent of the crimes he committed in 1937 and 1938, or the entire extent of his responsibility for the beginning of the war, which might not have been so unexpected if he had not been so convinced of his

infallibility. Everything we know now makes it incumbent on us to reevaluate our previous views of Stalin and to revise them. Life demands this and the historical truth demands this.

Yes, in certain cases one or another of us might be affected, we might be offended by the recollection that you might have said or written something about Stalin that you would not say or write now. It is especially easy to do this to the writer, whose books exist on the bookshelves and who can be, as it were, proved guilty of this inconsistency. But what comes of this? Does it follow that, knowing the extent of Stalin's crimes, the extent of the disasters he caused in the country, beginning in the thirties, the extent of his actions that ran counter to the interests of communism, knowing all this, should we remain silent about it? I think, on the contrary, it is our duty to put things in their proper places in the awareness of future generations.

At the same time, of course, it is necessary to weigh everything soberly and it is necessary to see various sides of Stalin's activity, and he should not be depicted as some kind of insignificant, petty, small-minded person. But attempts at this can sometimes be perceived in certain literary essays. Stalin, of course, was a very, very important person, a large-scale person. He was a politician whose personality cannot be written out of history. And particularly if one speaks of the war, this person did much that was necessary and much that had a positive influence on the course of events. All one need do is leaf through his correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill to understand the scale and political gifts of this person. And at the same time it is this person who is responsible for the fact that the army was not ready for war. This is the person who is responsible for 1938 and 1939 when he fulminated against the cadre of our army and when our army began to lag behind in its preparations for the war against the Germans, because by 1936 it had begun to get ahead of the Germans. And only Stalin's devastation of the military cadre, which was unprecedented in its scope, led to a situation where we began to lag behind the Germans both in our preparations for war and in the quality of our command personnel.

Of course, Stalin wanted victory. Of course, when the war began he did everything within his power for victory. He made both correct and incorrect decisions. He made mistakes, and he also had successes—both in the diplomatic struggle and in the military leadership of the war. One must try to depict all this as it was.

In one place in my book one of the heroes, Ivan Alekseyevich, says about Stalin that he was a great and strange person.¹ I think this is a true description and if one follows this description one can write the truth about

Stalin. I shall add on my own behalf: he was not only terrible, he was very terrible, immensely terrible. Just think that both Yezhov and that degenerate Beria—they were all just pawns for him, just people through whose hands he committed monstrous crimes. What is the scope of his own crimes if we speak quite truthfully of these pawns in his hand as the latest villains.

Yes, the truth about Stalin is a complicated truth; it has many sides, and it cannot be told in a couple of words. It must be written and explained as a complex truth and only then will it be the real truth.²

The is actually the main thing I wish to tell you in response. There is no time, as they say, to search for more precise formulations of my thoughts—this is not an article but a letter, but it seems that I have told you basically what I wanted to say.

I have no objection to your showing this letter to your opponent in the argument, Col Ratnikov.

With friendly greetings.

K. Simonov.

Footnotes

1. In the novel "Soldiers are not Born" Ivan Alekseyevich—one of the leaders of the General Staff—in 1943 reflects about Stalin: "The fact that he is great"—something flickered in his soul at the beginning of the war and then came back again—"no, you have no doubt about that now. But the fact that he was terrible? You are aware of that as well, and better than many. And every time you go to him for a report you know that he will stop at nothing. And where is the end of this iron will and the beginning of that incomprehensible stubbornness which cost tens of thousands of lives and entire cemeteries full of ruined equipment is something you will not understand right away. One need only note that this formula—"great and terrible"—was not unconditional, without reservations, and final either for the character or for the author of the novel. In another place in "Soldiers are not Born" Ivan Alekseyevich, reading in "War and Peace" considerations about greatness, immediately recalls Stalin and applies to him the criteria suggested by Tolstoy: "And perhaps Tolstoy is right when he says that there is no greatness without simplicity, goodness, and truth? This would seem too naive, as in a primer, but suddenly it seems difficult to reply to it as to a primer, even though you have completed two academies..."

2. Simonov's last work, "Through the Eyes of Man of My Generation (Reflections on I. V. Stalin)," is devoted to this group of problems (ZNAMYA, Nos 3, 4, 5, 1988).

U.S. Intentions To Increase SLCMs Viewed
*LD3107165988 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in English 1400 GMT 31 Jul 88*

[Text] The Soviet Union is rebuilding its foreign policy and in the past 3 years great positive changes have taken place in it. Humanity, says the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, have got much evidence of our determination to persistently translate into life the program of a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, to carry into effect the ideas of creating a universal security system, a common European home, defense sufficiency and nonaggressive defense, of the settlement of regional conflicts, the withdrawal of troops from the bases on other people's territories and the like.

Eduard Shevardnadze stresses the need to direct efforts to ensuring international security for political interaction of states. This is a very important provision. It should be mentioned that such interactions have already been manifested by the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on scrapping nuclear missiles of two classes. But how are (the events) developing further? The U.S. secretary of defense, Frank Carlucci, declares that at the talks on nuclear and space arms the United States cannot sacrifice the systems required for ensuring stable restraints, specifically such as sea-based cruise missiles, only for the sake of cutting down or control.

The question arises how can one in such a case imagine a future treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons? It follows from the American mass media that the Pentagon intends to deploy the Tomahawk missiles at more than 100 submarines, including about 800 nuclear ones. They cannot be excluded from the nuclear equilibrium. To preserve parity, the other side would have to counterbalance these missiles and not necessarily in a mirror way, and it is clear that no reduction of strategic offensive weapons is possible in this case.

We are aware of the American official statements; that is, if the Soviet Union does not give up its demands to limit cruise sea-based missiles the treaty may not take place. How can one assess such statements? As a means for exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, or perhaps as a preparation of a stronghold for regarding the talks for the period of the change of power in Washington? In any case all this cannot be called goodwill or political interaction. Moreover, there is a certain tradition in this United States stand in relation to all sea-based armaments. It is based on the prerequisite that the United States is a naval power and the Soviet Union is allegedly a ground one. That is why if it comes to arms limitation on sea they must be asymmetric; the Soviet Union must reduce more despite the fact that the supremacy in these arms is on the United States side. Needless to stress that such peculiar logic of the Americans is absolutely unacceptable. Needless to prove that the Soviet Union is a great naval power washed by waters of many seas of three oceans. It is enough to look at the map to become convinced of that, and the length of our sea borders is perhaps bigger than that of the United States.

It is also noteworthy that there are large stockpiles of nuclear bombs at American aircraft carriers, and the range of action of nuclear capable aircraft based on them is up to 3,300 km. The total number of nuclear capable craft on all U.S. strike aircraft carriers is nearing 600. These are verified data and they testify to the United States' unilateral superiority.

What conclusion can be drawn? It seems Mr Carlucci hopes to obtain at the Geneva talks an additional opportunity to build up the strategic superiority the United States already has. But can that promote deepening the positive tendencies in world politics? Certainly not. Neither will the strategic situation be stabilized if the agreement on cutting down strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent does not cover all types of strategic weapons.

The world public are coming out for further advances on the road of disarmament and scrapping nuclear weapons. The road to this objective must be straight.

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